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## THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

### RECENT SHIFTS IN ETHICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE\*

BY 'recent' shifts, I shall mean the changes that have occurred during the last two generations, that is, from about 1875 to the present, although I shall freely refer to the earlier part of the nineteenth century for orientation. The changes to be reviewed are chiefly those that have occurred in the United States.

By 'theory' I shall mean such theories as have been expounded in text-books in ethics used in American institutions of higher learning.

By ethical 'practice' I shall mean the practical outlook of the average American as implied in his more conspicuous ways of acting, and in his manifest approvals and disapprovals. The sources for determining this ethical practice are: newspapers, magazines, popular books, oral public utterances, and pervasive social movements, political and economic.

The value of such a survey is evident, even though it be as cursory as the one I shall attempt. During recent years, the number of ethics-texts appearing in America has increased rapidly; and courses in ethical theory, or in subjects related to it, have achieved a growing place in the curriculum of the American college. It is significant that the great majority of the texts published since 1875 have appeared since the World War, only twenty-one years ago. Surely it is profitable to examine just how far the ethical theories involved in all this writing and teaching evince any common tendencies. Also, the very marked increase in our practical concerns about problems of an ethical nature makes a critical re-

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view of the shifts in the popular moral outlook desirable. Nowadays, not only theoretical ethicists are interested in ethical problems, but also political scientists, historians, sociologists, jurists, and economists.

In such a survey of moral shifts, it will be of interest to discover how far changes in technical theory and in popular outlook coincide; and how far each is responsible for the other. And if we could go back of both trends to look for the more general causes of moral change in America, we would be relating not only theory to practice, but both of these to other recent and significant trends in our American civilization.

The obvious danger of such a survey is that one shall read *a priori* expectations into the evidence to the extent that it loses all value. I had several such prejudgments, which I found were contradicted by the facts.

#### I. FROM FORMALISM TO TELEOLOGY IN THEORY

In ethical theory, the first notable shift, and one familiar to us all, is that from Formalism to Teleology in determining the criterion of right and wrong. In adducing evidence for this shift, I cannot, of course, present analyses of all of the many texts examined. I can only refer to fair samples.

The Formalism of many of the conspicuous ethics-texts in use two or three generations ago is quite obvious. It is astonishing to us of today how unequivocally rigoristic some of this Formalism was. For instance, Joseph Haven, at one time Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in Amherst College, proclaims that "When we say that right and wrong are inherent . . . we simply assert that they are so, quite independent of the consequences that result from them".<sup>1</sup> This is fully as uncompromising as Whewell, who had considerable influence upon American teaching, and who writes: "Why must I do what is right? Because it is right. Why should I do what I ought? Because I ought."<sup>2</sup> This Formalism is clearly shown in the emphasis of the earlier texts upon lists of virtues and duties.

One of the influential forerunners of many such texts was William Paley's *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*.

<sup>1</sup> *Moral Philosophy* (1859), 49.

It is significant that over two-thirds of the pages devoted to ethics are given over to the exposition of our duties. Among the American ethicists greatly influenced by Paley (although not wholly agreeing with him) was Francis Wayland, President of Brown University and Professor of Moral Philosophy, who, for a while, used Paley in his classes. His own popular text, *The Elements of Moral Science*, ran into its fiftieth thousand in 1853—an astonishingly large circulation for a text in philosophy in those days. More than half of this text (or 247 pages) is taken up with an exposition of virtues and duties. So with L. P. Hickok's *A System of Moral Science* (1853), and Mark Hopkins' *The Law of Love and Love as a Law* (1869), which was popular as an ethics-text in a number of colleges during the following decade.

This Formalistic tradition, so far as it is evidenced by the stress upon virtues and duties, continued up to at least the early nineties. A text in fairly common use then (my own college used it) was Paul Janet's *Elements of Morals* (tr. 1887), commended in its Preface by J. G. Schurman of Cornell. Practically the entire treatise is occupied with the exposition of our duties; although it is only fair to mention that this book had been preceded by the author's *Morales*, which expounds the metaphysics from which this list of duties is deduced.

These are only a few samples, I hope not unfair, of the general complexion of ethics-texts used in America up to and even later than two generations ago. The Formalism involved—the code of virtues and duties—was quite commonly based upon God's will, expressed either through revelation, or through the "laws of nature", or through both. For instance, Paley argues that monogamy is a duty because "the equality in the number of males and females born into the world intimates the intention of God, that one woman should be assigned to one man"; also because "he at first created only one woman to one man".<sup>3</sup> In the same fashion Wayland argues with regard to our duties to brutes: the right to use them, and even to take their life, "is given to us by the revealed will of God". This right is reinforced by the law of nature, since "we are designed to subsist upon animal food".<sup>4</sup> Janet's text, continuing in

<sup>3</sup> William Whewell, *Elements of Morality Including Polity* (4th ed., 1864), 49.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, Bk. III, Pt. III, Ch. vi.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, 395.

use much later, concurs in this, saying that man, "in living on flesh, is justified by nature herself, who made him a carnivorous creature".<sup>5</sup> Hopkins establishes that woman's sphere of duty is the home by appealing to this same law of nature as the voice of God: "By a natural relation, and so by the appointment of God, the wife is the centre of the domestic circle. . . . By a natural relation the husband is . . . the guardian of the rights of the wife as of the children in their relations to society."<sup>6</sup> So he concludes that women should keep out of politics.

The contrast between these earlier texts and those current in America from the early nineties to the present day is striking. The Formalistic tendency has almost entirely given way to Teleology. The shift is from the notion of right for right's sake to right as a means to an end; from a code of rules to be obeyed to a goal to be achieved. The shift is shown clearly in the radical decrease of emphasis upon lists of virtues and duties until, at last, the majority of texts either present no such lists at all, or do so as applications of some teleological theory. The following are some fair samples, and appended to each is the fraction of the text devoted to virtues and duties:

Muirhead's *The Elements of Ethics* (1892), 1/15; Mackenzie's *A Manual of Ethics* (1893), 1/11; Seth's *A Study of Ethical Principles* (1894), 1/11; Fite's *An Introductory Study of Ethics*, (1903) 1/6; Thilly's *Introduction to Ethics* (1904), no list; Dewey and Tufts *Ethics* (1908), one chapter on "The Virtues", omitted in the revised edition (1932); Wright's *Self-Realization* (1913), less than 1/3; Everett's *Moral Values* (1918), 1/20; Sharp's *Ethics* (1928), no list; Barrett's *Ethics* (1933), no list; Wheelwright's *A Critical Introduction to Ethics* (1935), no list.

To summarize: Up to two generations ago and somewhat after, the ethics-texts in use in American colleges devoted from two-thirds to eleven-twelfths of their space to virtues and duties. Since about 1890, many texts present no such lists; others devote from one-twentieth to one-third to such a list, and then merely as an application or illustration of teleological theory. For example, while Mezes asserts that "That man is perfectly moral who is brave, temperate, benevolent, just, and wise", and devotes a chapter to

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, 134.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, 291.

each of these virtues, he points out that these virtues are of worth because they lead to acts "for the best interests or for the welfare of all sentient beings".<sup>7</sup> Thus the shift from the Formalistic tendency to Teleology seems conclusive. Durant Drake, in his *The New Morality* (1928), remarks: "By 'the new morality' I mean the morality which, basing itself solidly upon observation of the results of conduct, consciously aims to secure the maximum of attainable happiness for mankind."<sup>8</sup>

## II. THE NATURE OF RECENT TELEOLOGY

But, granting this shift, one is immediately confronted with the question: What is the *nature* of the Teleology that has replaced the Formalism of the last century? Well, it goes by many names, most of them meaning practically the same thing, so far as any meaning can be attached to it. It is spoken of as self-realization; the perfection of human personality; idealistic perfectionism; eudemonism; energism; total self-development; to be oneself at one's best; to become all one is capable of becoming; the ultimate unfoldment of all one's capacities and powers in a progressively rational unity.

Thus Paulsen, who thinks that "The most desirable thing would be for each individual to exercise . . . all the functions of life which lead to and are included in the perfection of his natural capacities".<sup>9</sup> Thus H. W. Wright: "As complete self-realization is man's highest good, the opportunity thus freely to realize his personal capacities is man's moral right."<sup>10</sup> Thus A. K. Rogers: "The general claim to a right to live the life that calls into exercise one's powers, subject to the right of others to the same thing is ultimate."<sup>11</sup> Thus Urban: "Good or value for man lies in the perfection of his functions."<sup>12</sup> Thus Hocking: "It is right, or absolutely right, that an individual should develop the powers that are in him . . . to become what he is capable of becoming."<sup>13</sup>

These and all the other ethicists committed to "self-realization"

<sup>7</sup> S. E. Mezes, *Ethics Descriptive and Explanatory* (1901), 413.

<sup>8</sup> Preface, v.

<sup>9</sup> Friedrich Paulsen, *A System of Ethics*, tr. by Thilly (1899), 627.

<sup>10</sup> *Self-Realization* (1913), 390. <sup>11</sup> *The Theory of Ethics* (1922), 197.

<sup>12</sup> W. M. Urban, *Fundamentals of Ethics* (1930), 117.

<sup>13</sup> W. E. Hocking, *The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights* (1926), 74.

lay emphasis upon life's breadth, its variety, its fullness: it is *total* self-realization.

In this shift from Formalism to Teleology, the *basis* of moral obligation has been radically altered. It is no longer founded upon God's will, whether expressed in revelation or in the "laws of nature"; nor is it usually founded in metaphysics. Rather, the imperative of teleological obligation tends to be based upon the authority of our fundamental and permanent desires over our merely passing and superficial wants; these fundamental desires being regarded as expressions of our fundamental capacities and powers, whose total realization is our highest good. Or, as it is sometimes put, obligation means the authority of the complete self over the partial self.

### III. TOWARD TELEOLOGY IN POPULAR OUTLOOK

Coincident with this trend toward Teleology in theory is the trend in the popular outlook. In general, this trend is revealed in the fact that there is a growing lack of that unanimity in popular moral judgments characteristic of moral convictions based upon rigid lists of duties, upon undeviating codes of conduct. For, naturally, there is likely to be much more divergence of moral opinion and less surety in the moral judgments of a people which appraises conduct as a means to an end rather than as possessing intrinsic value. There is possible much more disagreement concerning what is the true end of man and society than is possible with regard to a set of rules thought of as legislated by God. Even if there were agreement about this ultimate end, there is still possible considerable disagreement as to the proper means to attain it: that is, which acts are truly right and which are truly wrong—the difficulty inherent in any Teleology, and that which makes the moral quest a decided adventure, with many hazards of trial and error. Any table of duties deduced from a teleological outlook is no longer a rigid one; for every duty that can be named has exceptions due to time, place, and circumstance, let alone the uniqueness of the stage of progress in which any given individual may find himself.

This shift from Formalism to Teleology in the popular outlook is evinced by the steady increase of moral tolerance—in the de-

crease of harsh and hasty judgments upon one's fellowmen. This moral tolerance, due to the shift from Formalism, is conspicuously reflected in the American administration of law, where popular opinion always has its way at last. There was a time when the law was no respecter of persons: that time has passed. Formalism in the administration of law is gradually vanishing with the disappearance of Formalism in the popular moral outlook. The law has been "humanized". The administration of justice in America is no longer in terms of the merely external act committed, but is in terms also of the intentions, the motives, the circumstances, of the person involved in its edicts. Merely retributive justice has almost disappeared. With the teleological trend in morals, the criminal is conceived as a man not only with a past, but with a future.

And, with this popular teleological trend, some of the esteemed virtues of two generations ago have almost passed away: such as piety, humility, filial reverence. They perished because they did not seem to serve our purposes as we now conceive them. On the other hand, other virtues have been added as essential to our objectives. In a teleological scheme, the system of virtues and duties will always be in flux, since, as we progress in self-realization, "new occasions" will "teach new duties"; and time will make "ancient good uncouth". So, as would be expected in the popular adoption of the teleological outlook, the ancient duties that remain to us are differently ranked, differently emphasized. For instance, today the duties of sanitation and hygiene displace a number of the time-honored duties in relative importance.

#### IV. CAUSES OF THE SHIFT TO TELEOLOGY

The first general cause of the shift to Teleology in both theory and practice is the rise of modern science. There may be room for argument here; for one might hold with considerable reason that the rise of modern science itself was partly due to the teleological outlook, demanding, as it did, a new and more complete mastery of man and nature to attain man's ends. It may be that this is a matter of the reciprocity of cause and effect, and which of the two is the primary cause might be hard to determine. They might well be the conjoint effects of some cause common to both. But, at any rate, the rise of modern science and the emphasis upon Teleology

in morals are suspiciously coincident. Certainly, modern science has at least abetted the teleological outlook in three ways.

The first way was through the theory of evolution. All at once man was led to think of a vast future of possibilities, freeing his mind for large, constructive purposes. What a contrast to the previous view, theologically founded, that the world began at 4004 B.C., and that its end was immanent with the coming of Christ! It may or may not be significant that Darwin's *Origin of Species* appeared in 1859 and Mill's *Utilitarianism* only four years later: the one signalling the shift from the rigoristic classification of species to an ever-progressively changing classification; the other the shift from a rigoristic classification of duties to one correspondingly altered by time and circumstance. I do not at all mean that the former caused the latter; yet it is indisputable that the concept of evolution has had an immense influence in reinforcing the teleological outlook. I think that Paulsen is right when he remarks that we have returned to teleological ethics "under the influence of modern biological conceptions".<sup>14</sup> Certainly, upon the advent of the theory of evolution, there arose a formidable school of evolutionary ethicists, all committed to the teleological view.

The second way in which modern science has aided the teleological attitude is indirect, but, none-the-less, important. Through its increasing mastery of the human environment, especially as manifest in its inventions, science has enormously multiplied the efficient means for the attainment of the human purpose, whatever it may be. With this bewildering increase of means, the precise objective of them obtrudes itself as a crucial question. For what end, for what precise use, is all this manifold resourcefulness in manipulating nature and human nature? Only a defensible teleological theory can tell.

The third way in which science has encouraged the teleological view is through the urgency of such problems of the social sciences as merely formalistic conceptions could not answer. Law began to seek the criterion of right and wrong laws in the ultimate *objective* of all law; history could have no sound theory of progress without some definition of the *goal* of progress; political science found it necessary to justify the State in terms of its particular function in

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, Preface, xi.

the achievement of the human *end* it serves; economics found that its values could be made cogent only by relating them to the larger values which all civilization *seeks*.

The second general cause of the shift to Teleology in both theory and practice is the decline of the sort of religious faith upon which much of the old Formalism was based. This decline of religious faith is, of course, inextricably bound up with the growing ascendancy of the scientific spirit and method. Any Formalism based upon the will of God, expressed either through revelation or the so-called laws of nature, vanishes utterly before science's fundamental assumptions, the scientific method, and the scientific temper.

#### V. FROM INDIVIDUALISM TO SOCIAL REGARD IN THEORY

The second main shift in both theory and practice is toward an increased recognition of the social nature and the social obligations of the individual. The shift in theory becomes clear upon comparing the early texts used in American teaching with those in use from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to today.

Paley thinks that "private happiness is our motive".<sup>15</sup> Hickok devotes two entire chapters to personal duties, of which there are over a score, including such duties as that against suicide; against vanity; the duties regarding diet, cleanliness, intellectual circumspection, and the cultivation of the taste for beauty.<sup>16</sup> Haven presents four chapters on duties to self.<sup>17</sup> Hopkins writes six chapters on duties to ourselves, remarking that "Our own good is of intrinsic value, and we are especially bound to care for it. . . . God cares for it, and why not we?"<sup>18</sup> Janet gives us four chapters on duties toward oneself, concerned with our bodies, our external goods, our intellects, and our wills.<sup>19</sup>

But, as early as the seventies, there is a shift away from the recognition of duties to one's self, as a special class. F. H. Bradley, who had influence upon the best American thought, insists in his *Ethical Studies* (1876) that "The individual apart from the community is an abstraction. It is not anything real. . . . In short, man is a social being; he is real only because he is social, and can realize himself only because it is as social that he realizes himself."<sup>20</sup> And

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, 59. <sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, 161.

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.* <sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*  
<sup>20</sup> 173 f.

Spencer, although devoting an entire Part of his *Principles of Ethics* (1879) to the "Ethics of the Individual Life", introduces it by saying that "such care of self . . . is implied in a proper regard for others".<sup>21</sup> He then proceeds to give egoism an altruistic justification. From the late seventies on, there practically disappears from ethics-texts used in America any separate class of strictly personal virtues, or of duties to oneself. So far as virtues and duties are mentioned at all, they are social. Thus, for example, while Bowne asserts that duties to self "must take the first rank in ethics", most of such duties turn out to be socially referenced, and he arrives at the conclusion that "the moral life finds its chief field in the service to the common good".<sup>22</sup>

The next question is: What particular aspects of society does this increasing social regard tend to stress? The answer is clear: the stress is chiefly upon the political and the economic orders.

#### VI. RECENT EMPHASIS UPON THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORDERS

The interest of ethicists in the political order is, of course, nothing new. It is at least as old as Plato and Aristotle. But, with the more recent re-emphasis upon the social nature of the self, there has arisen a renewed analysis and evaluation of the political aspect of society. The political interest of such men as Mill, Sidgwick, and Spencer in the earlier part of what I have chosen to call the 'recent' period is well known. And this same interest on the part of our American ethicists is evident, even increasingly evident, up to the present. This interest is not shown merely in the textbooks, but in monographs and books especially devoted to the application of ethical theory to the field of political science. Indeed, this field has become a favorite one for many of our American philosophers, among whom one might cite Tufts,<sup>23</sup> Mecklin,<sup>24</sup> Wilde,<sup>25</sup> T. V. Smith,<sup>26</sup> Hocking,<sup>27</sup> Cohen,<sup>28</sup> Meiklejohn,<sup>29</sup> Robinson,<sup>30</sup> Leighton,<sup>31</sup>

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*, 484. <sup>22</sup> Borden P. Bowne, *Principles of Ethics* (1893), ch. viii.

<sup>23</sup> J. H. Tufts, *Our Democracy* (1917).

<sup>24</sup> J. M. Mecklin, *An Introduction to Social Ethics* (1920).

<sup>25</sup> Norman Wilde, *The Ethical Basis of the State* (1924).

<sup>26</sup> *The Democratic Way of Life* (1925); *The American Philosophy of Equality* (1926); *The Promise of American Politics* (1936).

<sup>27</sup> W. E. Hocking, *Man and the State* (1926); *Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights* (1926); *The Spirit of World Politics* (1932).

<sup>28</sup> M. R. Cohen, *Law and the Social Order* (1933).

<sup>29</sup> Alexander Meiklejohn, *What Does America Mean?* (1935).

<sup>30</sup> D. S. Robinson, *Political Ethics* (1935).

<sup>31</sup> J. A. Leighton, *Social Philosophies in Conflict* (1937).

Sabine,<sup>32</sup> and Dewey.<sup>33</sup> I mention only a few, and these merely as representative of this decisive trend. Also, of late years there has appeared an increasing number of books and articles by specialists in law and politics on the ethical basis of the State.

It is significant that most ethicists dealing with the political order have laid special and increasing emphasis upon the ethics of democracy in general and upon American democracy in particular.

The second social emphasis of recent moral theorists is upon the economic order. It is here that we find a decided contrast to the ethicists of the nineteenth century, who, as a rule, gave little or no attention to economics. One only has to refer to the earlier texts already cited—those of Paley, Wayland, Hickok, Haven, Hopkins, Janet. Indeed, up to the first decade of the twentieth century, the texts commonly in use in America ignore economics almost entirely. Paulsen (1889)<sup>34</sup> inserts only a small chapter on "The Economic Life" (13 pages out of 712); and there is practically no economic reference in such later popular texts as those of Muirhead (1892),<sup>35</sup> Mackenzie (1893),<sup>36</sup> Seth (1894),<sup>37</sup> Fite (1903),<sup>38</sup> and Thilly (1904).<sup>39</sup> But during the last twenty years the interest of American ethicists in economic problems has been growingly pronounced. In 1908 appeared the *Ethics* of Dewey and Tufts, with four entire chapters dealing with an ethical interpretation of the economic life. This emphasis was expanded in the revised edition (1932), which contained a new chapter on "Collective Bargaining and the Labor Union". From about 1908 to the present, the interest of our moralists in economics has been definite and sustained. To mention fair samples from among the texts of the last decade: W. K. Wright (1929)<sup>40</sup> devotes about a tenth of his space to the economic field; Leighton (1930) devotes nearly one-third of his discussion of applied ethics to economic considerations;<sup>41</sup> Urban (1930)<sup>42</sup> gives considerable attention to the ethics of property; Barrett (1933)<sup>43</sup> discusses economic liberty and justice under five heads; Wheelwright (1935)<sup>44</sup> devotes four chap-

<sup>32</sup> G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (1937).

<sup>33</sup> John Dewey's writings in the political field are numerous and well known, beginning with his monograph on *The Ethics of Democracy* (1888).

<sup>34</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>35</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>36</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>37</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>38</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>39</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup> *General Introduction to Ethics.*

<sup>41</sup> J. A. Leighton, *The Individual and the Social Order.*

<sup>42</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>43</sup> Clifford Barrett, *Ethics.*

<sup>44</sup> Philip Wheelwright, *A Critical Introduction to Ethics.*

ters to economic problems, chiefly with relation to the capitalistic system; Titus (1936)<sup>45</sup> gives to economics two chapters, one on business ethics and the other on the moral problems of industrial society; and other ethicists have written special monographs on the ethical aspects of economic problems.

It is significant to note that, parallel with the leaning of most of our ethicists dealing with the State toward *political* democracy, many of those who discuss the economic order tend to sanction, directly or indirectly, some form of *industrial* democracy.

#### VII. TOWARD THE SOCIAL REGARD IN POPULAR OUTLOOK

Just as we find the shift to Teleology in theory duplicated in the popular outlook, so, also, do we find that the popular conscience has shifted, with theory, toward an increasing social regard. The evidences are clearly seen in the growing popular literature on social service; in the rapid rise of social-service clubs and multitudinous organizations for social reform; and in the emphasis upon the social mission of religion. Laws of negligence are administered today in terms of an enlarged conception of social responsibility. The notion of democracy itself has left behind its former conception of "rugged individualism" and commits itself to the idea of a social goal drastically limiting the freedom of the individual person. Political democracy is no longer conceived as an end in itself, but as a means to the attainment of a larger and ideal social order. Equality is no longer the equality of atomistic members of the State, with the equal right to assert their own several rights, but is an equality socially modified and socially motivated. Liberty is no longer a mere matter of individual freedoms not to be encroached upon, but is increasingly regarded as the guarantee of a set of conditions favorable to achieving the social objective. Freedom becomes the freedom to seek the social goal, in accordance, indeed, with the reason of each, but freely and voluntarily subject to the revision of all. The real difference of American opinion today is not so much with regard to what liberty means, nor is it chiefly engaged in a rebellion against the abridgment of the liberty of individuals as individuals. The real difference of opinion is with regard to what is the best way of abridging our liberties for the

<sup>45</sup> H. H. Titus, *Ethics for Today*.

sake of the social good: as, for instance, how far they are best limited by law, and how far best limited by an enlightened public opinion.

These are some of the evidences pointing toward the socialization of the outlook of the masses, coincident with the emphasis upon the social self in ethical theory. Many other evidences could be adduced; but those here given are sufficient to show the popular trend.

#### VIII. CAUSES OF THE SHIFT TO THE SOCIAL SELF

This marked socialization of moral standards in both theory and practice is due, chiefly, to three causes:

First, the influence of the concept of evolution, which laid emphasis upon the survival of the species, rather than that of any given individual. Muirhead (1892), writing on the importance of the theory of evolution in the field of ethics, is convinced that "It makes individualistic presuppositions untenable".<sup>46</sup>

The second cause is the increasing psychological emphasis upon the self as fundamentally social by nature.

The third cause is found in the growing interdependence, culturally and economically, of all individuals and groups, largely due to modern specialization and the co-operation which this involves, plus the manifold means of intercommunication serving this integration of the specialized functions of society.

One might add to these three causes the phenomenal increase of interest in the social sciences, such as political science, history, sociology, economics, law, almost immediately driven to the solution of problems about their socially ethical implications.

#### IX. RECIPROCAL RELATIONS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

We have found that, in general, the shifts in recent theory and popular outlook tend to coincide. At once we are confronted with an interesting speculation: How far is there an intercausal influence in these two shifts? How far has the shift in ethical theory affected the popular outlook? How far has the shift in popular outlook affected ethical theory? If either is the primary cause of the other, it seems improbable that it is ethical theory: the masses do not read the texts. But the ethicist certainly cannot isolate him-

<sup>46</sup> *Op. cit.*, 132.

self so easily from the drift of the prevailing opinion of his times. Most likely, both shifts, coincident in their trend, are conjoint effects of common causes present in the march of civilization. The exact determination of these common causes, if such there be, I shall not attempt here. But it is a vital problem which must be solved if we are to have an adequate history of recent morals.

#### X. THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE OF ETHICAL THEORY

It would be presumptuous to attempt to forecast what are likely to be the next significant shifts in ethical theory and practice. But one can indicate certain emphases which seem desirable if ethical theory is to progress in a way at all comparable with the recent progress of the natural and social sciences.

First, the ethicist should become more critically conscious of the logical methods involved in his investigations. I have referred to the influence of natural science, particularly to the influence of the concept of evolution upon ethical theory and practice. Yet, in spite of the first enthusiastic pronouncements of some evolutionary ethicists that, at last, ethics was to become "scientific", and in spite of the light evolution has cast upon the moral development of the race, the assimilation of ethics to the subject-matter and method of the natural sciences is less and less apparent among most theorists of reputation and influence. Among not only philosophical but scientific methodologists there is an increased questioning of the assumption that all demonstrable truth is embraced within the region of "scientific method", and an increased awareness that the limits of the logic of the natural sciences are not conterminous with the limits of logic itself. But just how far and in what sense ethics can use scientific methods, and how far and precisely in what sense it must appeal to a logic, just as cogent, beyond the limits of these methods, is worthy of still more serious and expert consideration. Brightman thinks that "there has been a lack of clear-cut progress and of scientific systematization in ethical thought".<sup>47</sup> He adds that "in the field of ethics we are still in the pioneering stage".<sup>48</sup>

Second, it is quite likely that, with a keener awareness of its epistemology, and in keeping with the growing metaphysical refer-

<sup>47</sup> E. S. Brightman, *Moral Laws* (1933), 21.

<sup>48</sup> *Op. cit.*, 30.

ence emerging from the larger problems of the natural sciences, ethics also will find it necessary to examine anew its own metaphysical presuppositions. In later years there has been a decided decline of reference by ethicists to the fundamental ontological implications of moral theory. Sometimes the metaphysics of freedom is still discussed; but even then it is likely to be with the pragmatic intent of making the moral order at least plausible. Surely the major problems of metaphysics, such, for instance, as the relation of 'mind' to 'body', touch vitally the expert formulation of any ethical system, if it is to be made thoroughly cogent.

Third, there is needed a careful revision of the data of ethics in terms of our modern knowledge, for the sake of ethics itself and for the sake of securing the serious attention and respect of contemporary minds. For instance, during the last generation the science of psychology has gained more and more influence; yet, parallel with its vast growth, ethicists have referred to its findings less and less. Mackenzie (1893)<sup>49</sup> gives over a "Prolegomena, Chiefly Psychological", comprising six chapters, to the psychological foundations of ethical theory. Seth (1894)<sup>50</sup> devotes an entire chapter to the psychological basis. And Ladd (1902) writes at length on the psychological analysis of the "moral feelings".<sup>51</sup> Today, ethicists still refer to psychology, especially in their discussions of hedonism; but, like the psychology of the ethics-texts of the nineties, it is chiefly the psychology of introspection. The decline of psychological reference in the sense of recent psychology is quite understandable. For the psychological interest of ethicists has been chiefly in the analysis of such mental states as feeling, desire, volition, motive, intention, and conscience. The modern shift of psychology as a science of mental states to psychology as a biological discipline has been concomitant with its growing abandonment by ethicists. One hazards that if it were possible to revive the psychologists' interest in mental processes as such, many ethicists would welcome it, not a few agreeing with Ladd that the psychological method "is the primary and the most promising and actually rewarding manner of approaching the study of ethical problems".<sup>52</sup> What Everett said as far back as twenty years ago is

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>50</sup> *Op. cit.*, 21.

<sup>51</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> G. T. Ladd, *Philosophy of Conduct*.

still true: "What is needed is a more adequate psychology of moral experience which shall exhibit the scientific basis for the insights which already exist in proverbial philosophy."<sup>53</sup> This remark is especially pertinent now in view of the fact that, recently, moral obligation tends to be psychologically founded—that obligation and the feeling of obligation tend to be treated as one and the same, when carried to their ultimate terms as the authority of fundamental and permanent wants over those merely superficial and temporary. Also in view of the fact that the prevailing self-realization theories remain fairly vague and without sufficient scientific content in the absence of an adequate psychology of desire.

Having surveyed these various shifts during the last two generations, and having named certain desirabilities of the immediate future, one cannot avoid wondering what will be the complexion of the prevailing theory of two generations hence. But when one realizes that, at the rate of the increase of ethics-texts in America alone since the World War, there will have appeared by that date several times more than are now extant, one cautiously refrains from prophecy and tries to rest content in the hope that by then both our moral theory and practice shall have become even more befitting ourselves as rational animals.

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<sup>53</sup> W. G. Everett, *Moral Values* (1918), 319 f.

## PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE\*

THERE is a philosophical problem which is perhaps the most fundamental of all but to which philosophical books, when they mention it at all, give for the most part only a few pages in an introductory chapter. This problem is, what specifically distinguishes philosophy from other human enterprises and what sort of method is appropriate to its tasks. The need to deal with this question much more thoroughly than is customary is forced on our attention today by the glaring contrast between the states of affairs prevailing respectively in philosophy and in the sciences. For in the latter, we find a steady progress which has resulted in the accumulation of a vast body of positive knowledge; whereas in philosophy what we find is, to quote Professor Hoernlé, "that all new theories do but add to the babel and confusion, that there is no cumulative co-operative advance from generation to generation, no funded stock of philosophical truths which can be taught as its established rudiments to beginners, and which are taken for granted by all experts as the basis of further enquiry. The same problems are ever examined afresh . . . the old problems remain persistently open".<sup>1</sup>

This situation in philosophy would I believe rapidly improve if philosophers knew more clearly than I think they usually do just what it is that distinguishes philosophy from the sciences. The layman often asks us what exactly is philosophy, and I venture there is no question we find harder to answer to his satisfaction, or, I suspect, really to our own. Because of its basic importance for the future progress of philosophy, and because none of the answers currently given to it seem to me really defensible, I propose on this occasion to outline the one which a careful examination of the facts appears to me to dictate.

1. *Some current hypotheses as to the nature of philosophy.*—It is only proper, however, that I should first indicate the grounds for my belief that none of the usual answers is acceptable. Unfortunately, limitations of time will not now permit more than a very few words for this—too few, I am afraid, to pass as ade-

\*The presidential address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Columbia University, December 27, 1939.

<sup>1</sup> *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, 48.

quately presenting the opinions criticized or as effectively disposing of them.

Of these opinions, the one probably most often met with is that the problems of philosophy differ from those of science in being more general. According to Herbert Spencer, for instance, philosophy carries the process of generalization one stage higher than do the sciences, so that the truths of philosophy "bear the same relation to the highest scientific truths that each of these bears to lower scientific truths".<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately for this view, however, it is in vain that we seek in the writings of philosophers for any truths from which, to take one of Spencer's own examples, one could deduce the laws at once of dynamics, of thermotics, and of economics, as one can deduce, for instance, the laws of the dynamics of fluids from those of general dynamics. Moreover, that the propositions of philosophy are not more general than such laws, but are about something else, is indicated by the fact that, unlike these laws, they lay no claim to the power of predicting events in Nature. It is sometimes said, of course, that each science represents a species of knowledge, whereas what philosophy, or more specifically epistemology, studies is knowledge in general; and that the subject-matter of epistemology therefore differs from that of any of the sciences in being more general. But this is only to confuse knowledge in the sense of *facts known* with knowledge in the sense of *knowing*. The various sciences are not various species of knowing, but are the knowing of various species of facts. And what epistemology studies is not these same facts at a more general level, but the relation, called knowing, which the scientist seeks to establish between his mind and those facts.

Again, some metaphysicians have conceived the task of philosophy to be the construction of a picture of the universe such that man, as a seeker of values, should feel at home in it or at least find life in it acceptable. But if construction of such world-views is philosophy, then philosophy is essentially wishful thinking, and the world-views it formulates represent, not knowledge, but each only a more or less self-consistent content for a comforting possible faith. I submit, however, that philosophy is neither poetry nor the

<sup>2</sup> *First Principles*, § 3.

inventing of possible articles of faith, but definitely a knowledge-seeking enterprise.

The task of philosophy, again, has been described by some writers as consisting in the analysis of concepts. But the sciences too analyse some concepts; and if one should then say with Dr. Broad that the concepts philosophy analyses are "fundamental" ones, this only raises the question what marks a concept as fundamental. Dr. Broad does not answer it, but only mentions some of the concepts he would so label. Yet the answer to it is what we must have if we are to know exactly what then differentiates philosophy from the sciences.

Yet another view of philosophy is that urged by Professor Carnap and certain other writers. He believes that if, from the variety of questions philosophers have discussed, we reject the many which represent only pseudoproblems, all that then remain are questions concerning the logic of science. These, he contends, appear to be questions about objects, but all really are questions concerning the syntax of the language of science. And he therefore concludes that philosophy, insofar as its problems are not spurious, is the study of the syntax of the language of science.

It may be observed first, however, that the language of science is not the only language there is. We have also the language of art, the language of religion, the languages of law, of morals, and so on; for man is not exclusively a cognitive, science-building animal. And these other languages too have their respective syntaxes. If problems of syntax are philosophical problems at all, then I submit that they are such no matter whether the syntax concerned is that of the language of science or of religion, of morals or of art, or of any other basic human interest; and therefore that philosophy has a much broader field than the view under consideration assigns to it.

But the opinion that philosophical problems are syntactical problems at all seems to me definitely erroneous. Professor Carnap bases it on the contention that there exist two "modes of speech", which he calls respectively the material and the formal modes; and that assertions in the material mode of speech can be translated into the formal mode. The assertions of philosophy, he observes,

present themselves mostly in the material mode of speech. Like all assertions in this mode they appear to be about objects, but really are about words; and this becomes obvious when they are translated into the formal mode of speech.

Let us, however, examine the alleged translating. In some of Professor Carnap's examples, it consists only in restating unambiguously something that was stated vaguely or incorrectly. This, of course, is strictly not translating but construing; and has anyway no particular bearing on the contention that philosophy is logical syntax. The examples that are crucial for this contention are of a different kind. Their kind may be illustrated by the sentence 'This book treats of Africa', which is said to be in the material mode of speech, and is said to be translated into the formal mode by the sentence 'This book contains the word Africa' (or an expression synonymous with it). I submit, however, that to call this *translation* is obviously to misuse the term, for translation consists in saying the same thing in different words; whereas these two sentences do not say the same thing at all, but different things. If this should need any proof, it would be furnished by the fact that the truth-value of each sentence is independent of the truth-value of the other; for there *can* be a book which treats of Africa but does not contain the word 'Africa' or any expression synonymous with it; and there *can* be a book containing the word 'Africa' but not treating of Africa, for instance a rhyming dictionary.

In this and similar examples, the so-called two modes of speech thus are not two sets of words for saying one and the same thing, but two sets of words for saying each a different thing. The continent, called 'Africa', is one topic and the word, 'Africa', is another; and no statement to the effect that the word, 'Africa', has certain relations to certain other words is a translation, properly so called, of any statement about the continent, called 'Africa'. It may be possible, of course, to give a rule for matching certain statements about the continent called 'Africa', each with a statement about the word 'Africa' having the same truth-value. The two sets of statements would then be *parallel as to truth-value*. But even then they would be each about a different thing, the ones about a piece of land and the others about a word. And therefore

to describe the ones as *translations* of the others would be to misconceive their relation.

But just this misconception appears to be the whole basis for the contention that philosophy is the study of logical syntax, for this contention is rested squarely on the assumption that a statement *about a word* and giving its relation to certain other words can be truly a translation of, that is, be strictly synonymous with, a statement *about something other than a word*. This assumption, however, is obviously false, and its falsity implies that such statements in the material mode of speech as we are now considering cannot, strictly speaking, be translated into the formal mode of speech. And from this it follows that although the study of logical syntax may well be exceedingly useful for philosophical purposes, and is perhaps even a part of philosophy, it nevertheless is the study of a subject at least narrower than that of philosophy.

Another current conception of philosophy still remains to be mentioned, the one, namely, according to which philosophy is essentially "vision, imagination, reflection", employed to guide to a prosperous issue actions dealing with social and moral problems. This is the view represented by Professor Dewey's famous statement that philosophy "recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men".<sup>3</sup> In America today, action practical in ways both obvious and direct is an object of well-nigh universal worship, and a view of philosophy which assigns to it a function practical in this glamorous sense therefore commends itself to the spirit of the age. But reflection forces on us the fact that to contrast the problems of philosophers with the problems of men is to forget that philosophers too are men, and therefore that the problems of philosophers are some of the problems of men just as truly as are the problems of astronomers and mathematicians, of poets and musicians, of social and moral reformers, or of the persons for whose benefit the reforms are proposed. For man does not live by economic, political, social or other practical conditions alone. In him, thought is capable of being a *mode of life* even in cases where its usual function as an *instrument for life* is indiscernible

<sup>3</sup> *Creative Intelligence*, 65.

or totally absent. And I submit that man's capacity to be impractical and to starve in a garret for the sake of thought or of art or of religion indicates more truly what man distinctively is than does the capacity he shares with the animals to use the intelligence he has to minister to his more obvious needs. For after all, when man erects even an Empire State building or a Hoover dam, the end to which he is then devoting his superior intelligence is of exactly the same sort as that which an animal such as the beaver is striving to achieve.

2. *Philosophy seeks knowledge and its method must therefore be scientific.*—The hypothesis as to the nature of philosophy for which I shall now argue takes it for granted at the outset that the enterprise of philosophy is distinct both from that of religion and of poetry, and distinct also from that of the natural sciences. But it takes for granted that philosophy, like these sciences, seeks knowledge. The knowledge it seeks, moreover, is not knowledge in a different or less rigorous sense but in the very same sense, that, namely, in which knowledge is contrasted with guesses, articles of faith, snap-judgments, vague or unsupported opinions, prejudices, or wish-born beliefs. But if philosophy seeks knowledge in this same sense, then its method must necessarily be likewise scientific, for 'scientific' means nothing more and nothing less than *knowledge-yielding*. This, however, does not imply that scientific method will take in philosophy the same specific forms it has in physics or in biology, or even in mathematics. For such specific forms are dictated by specific subject-matter and differ even as between one and another of the sciences.

3. *Philosophy has a subject-matter distinct from that of the natural or the formal sciences.*—Thus what essentially differentiates philosophy from the other sciences can be only a subject-matter distinct from theirs. Of course, we hear it said today that, beside the subject-matter of the natural sciences and that of the formal sciences, none remains for philosophy to claim as its own. But I shall try to show that this is not the case.

To avoid misunderstandings, however, let us agree to begin with that by the 'formal' sciences will be meant pure logic and pure mathematics, and by the 'natural' sciences all the sciences that study what has commonly been called Nature or the material world.

These sciences will thus include, for instance, physics and chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, and both physiological and behavioristic psychology; also the social sciences if these are taken only as studies of human behavior. But in the social sciences I would class on the contrary as applied philosophy, whatever there may be other than study of behavior. As regards history, the term usually designates particularly the study of human societies or human activities in their time-dimension; but there is of course also such a thing as the history of the solar system, or of the earth, or of a given tree, etc. More generally, then, we may say that history is the study, in the time-dimension, of any sort of facts that exist in time.

4. *Primitive and derivative subject-matter.*—Turning now to the question of the subject-matter distinctive of philosophy, it will be useful as a first step to see what form an answer to the corresponding question would take in the easier case of the natural sciences.

To say, as we did a moment ago, that their subject-matter is Nature or the world of material events only raises the question what exactly we mean by these terms. And it is not easy to find for them a definition that will apply equally to things as diverse as light and heat, the causes of earthquakes, the differences in basal metabolism for different races, the mechanisms of heredity, the varieties of sub-atomic particles, the marriage customs of the Dyaks, the determinants of the properties of alloys, etc., all of which belong to this Nature that the natural sciences investigate. A solution of the difficulty becomes discernible only when it occurs to us to make a certain most important distinction, that, namely, between what we may call the *primitive* facts of a science, and its *derivative* facts.

The primitive facts of a science are those which, for the given science, are beyond question. They comprise, on the one hand, the facts about which are the very first, most elementary questions that the science asks, and on the other the facts to which the science ultimately appeals in testing the validity of its hypotheses. The primitive facts of a science are thus the sort of facts which originate or terminate its inquiries. An example of a primitive fact which originates inquiry in physics would be the rising and falling

of the tide. *That* the tide does rise and fall is obvious at many places and is then not questioned; but it is something *about which* many questions occur to the physicist. Other facts primitive for a physicist would be, on certain occasions, that a given string is stretched; that he plucks it; that a sound occurs; that a certain string is longer than a certain other; that certain metal filings are clinging to a certain metal bar; that a certain body is moving, etc. About these facts many questions would arise, but in many cases the facts themselves would be regarded as established beyond question by ordinary perceptual observation. On the other hand, examples of primitive facts functioning in certain cases as terminative rather than as originative of physical inquiries would be that a certain pointer is at a certain place on a graduated scale; that on a certain occasion no sound occurs when a given bell is struck; that on a certain occasion two falling bodies do not reach the ground at the same time, etc.

The derivative facts of a given science, on the other hand, are those eventually discovered as a result of the attempt to analyse or synthesise its primitive facts. A derivative fact, after it has been discovered, may itself become the subject of new questions, or may serve to answer certain other questions. Examples of terms, again from physics, which name derivative facts and which enter into the formulation of the derivative facts we call laws and explanations would be magnetic field, atom, proton, electric charge, electric potential, velocity, mass, acceleration, energy, etc.

In the light of the distinction between primitive and derivative facts, we may now say that *the subject-matter distinctive of a science consists of the sort of facts that are primitive for it, plus any facts implicit in the primitives and about which problems may arise in turn*. The illustrations given make obvious something very important to notice, namely, that in physics or any other science at all advanced, the overwhelming majority of the statements made by the science are explicitly and directly not about its primitive but about its derivative facts. And, because of this, the latter may easily seem to be what the science is really about. But since they are known at all only derivatively from the primitive and more vulgar ones, and indeed have claim to belong to the given science only because they are implicit in the primitives of specifically that

science, those primitives, although seldom explicitly mentioned in the assertions reached by the science, are nevertheless what all its assertions are *ultimately* about. And this means that the subject-matter distinctive of a given science is ultimately defined by the very ones among its facts which it least often explicitly mentions in the statements of its results. This, as we shall see, is true likewise of philosophy.

5. *The subject-matter of the natural sciences.*—In the light of these remarks, what can we now say is the subject-matter distinctive of the natural sciences as a group? I submit that their primitive facts are *any facts ascertainable by ordinary external perception*; that is, facts that are *perceptually public* in the sense that common perceptual observation is what establishes them as beyond question for all the practitioners of those sciences. It is true that we may doubt the factuality of what perception exhibits in a given case; but, if we were to doubt it in *every* case, there would then be nothing left at all of the problems the natural sciences investigate. For there is no such thing as a problem without data, and the primitive data of the natural sciences are perceived data. This being clear, we may now say that *Nature*, which is the subject-matter distinctive of the natural sciences, consists of *such facts as are susceptible of being perceptually public, plus such facts as are analytically or synthetically implicit in these*.

6. *The subject-matter of the formal sciences.*—A word more briefly now as to the subject-matter of the formal sciences. Their primitive facts, I submit, consist of certain entities created by us through stipulations. These stipulations are of the kinds we call postulates, definitions, and rules of formation and of transformation. The entities created by such stipulations are created exclusively out of the sort of material which we may call discursive or verbal material, that is, *utterable* material, it being theoretically indifferent whether the utterances of it be in a given case graphic, oral, or other.

The derivative facts of the formal sciences, on the other hand, which we may call their *theorems*, consist of the sentences which may be derived from the primitive verbal facts just described, by means of the rules that are a part of the latter. The knowledge given us by the formal sciences is thus *a priori* knowledge, for the

differentia of *a priori* knowledge is, I submit, that the truth-value of its propositions is *determined by choices of our own*. But although so determined in all cases, their truth-value may be known to us either *directly* in the making of the choices, as when we lay down postulates, definitions, and rules, or only *indirectly* by deduction from these, as in the case of theorems.

7. *Is Mind the subject-matter distinctive of philosophy?*—The outcome of our inquiry as to the subject-matter distinctive of the natural sciences now makes evident that there does exist a range of facts not investigated by them, nor, except perhaps in one of its parts, by the formal sciences. It consists of *the facts ascertainable by introspection, and of those implicit in them*. But if I were to claim at this point that these facts constitute the subject-matter distinctive of philosophy, and that philosophy is therefore the science of Mind, several apparently insuperable objections would immediately suggest themselves. One would be that facts of introspection are not verifiable, and therefore that a science of them is not genuinely possible. A second would be that even if a science of them were possible, its right name would be not philosophy but introspective psychology. A third objection would be that although philosophy has some concern with Mind, it is concerned also with the relation between Nature and Mind, and with Reality in general. And a fourth objection, of course, would be that contemporary naturalism has shown Mind to be a part of Nature, and therefore that to assume Mind to be distinct from Nature is a fundamental error. I believe, however, and will now attempt to show, that these seemingly formidable objections are based not on superior insights but much rather mostly on confusions of thought.

8. *Is Mind a part of Nature?*—Let us examine them; and first let us consider the contention of contemporary naturalism that Mind is a part of Nature. It is easy, of course, so to define the word Mind that Mind shall then be a part of Nature, just as, by defining black as a species of white, it is easy to prove that negroes are a part of the white race. But such high-handed verbal procedures are obviously futile. What they do is only to construct an arbitrary language which, by using familiar words in novel senses, makes it seem that one is talking about the things these words

familiarly denote when in fact one is talking about something very different. For example, what naturalism chooses to call Mind is something which in ordinary English would be called *the behavior of bodies that have minds*. Study of the behavior of such bodies is perfectly legitimate and very important, but it is not study of the same thing that the word Mind denotes in ordinary English, namely, *the realm of facts accessible only through introspection*. Only confusion results from using the same word for both of these very different subjects of study; for to do so leads to the belief that naturalism has made important discoveries about that which in ordinary English is denoted by the word Mind, whereas the truth is that a consistent naturalism is not interested at all in that, but in something which remains quite different from that even when arbitrarily called by the same name.

It thus turns out that the claim of naturalism that Mind is a part of Nature represents only its own initial resolution to make every term it uses, and in particular the term Mind, denote at any cost something *in Nature*, that is, something *in the perceptually accessible world*. But, let it be well noted, this resolution is not forced on those who make it by any facts. It represents only the initial and perfectly free espousal, by certain thinkers, of the ontological position which defines both the scope and the limits of all natural science. This seldom stated and seldom conscious ontological commitment is this: *To be real is to be either something susceptible of being perceptually public, or something implicit therein*. To commit oneself to such a position is of course to commit oneself to ignore the world of introspectively accessible facts, that is, the world of Mind; but to have thus decided to ignore it is not in the least to have invalidated the contrast traditionally expressed by the words Mind and Nature or Mind and Matter. This contrast is based on the existence of two modes of observation, namely, introspection and objective perception, which common sense regards, and I believe rightly, as irreducibly distinct. On the present occasion there is unfortunately no time for me to argue their distinctness. I can only state that I take it to be a fact; and, to avoid misunderstandings, add that—in agreement I believe with most introspective psychologists—I regard attention to

our own sensations as a case of introspective observation. My statement of this may on the present occasion be taken only as clarifying what I propose to mean by introspection, for there is not time to go into the merits of the question. I can at most mention in connection with it that, although I do admit a distinction between *sensing* and *sensum*, I take it to be not as usually assumed one between sensing and *object* of sensing, but between sensing and *species* of sensing. That is, when we speak for instance of tasting quinine, quinine is the name of an *object* of taste; but when we speak of tasting bitter, bitter is the name of a *species* of taste. Thus tasting a substance and tasting a taste are tasting in two radically different senses of the word. In the first, tasting is a case of objective perception, but in the second tasting is a case of introspection.

9. *Are assertions about introspectable facts verifiable?*—I turn now to the contention that the facts of introspection, because of their private character, are not amenable to scientific study. Let us suppose that someone asserts, as generalizations from his own introspective experience, that jealousy is a more unpleasant feeling than anxiety, or that hearing the word 'triangle' regularly causes to arise the image of a three-sided closed figure. These generalizations are statements of alleged properties of some human minds. Another person cannot directly verify whether they are indeed possessed by the mind of the person who has stated them; but he can decide by introspection whether his own mind possesses them. And, by obtaining the testimony of other persons, he can decide what percentage more or less of human minds possess them.

A statistical inquiry concerning the properties of human minds differs from statistical inquiries concerning the properties of objects in Nature only in that in the former, but not in the latter, the taking of testimony is an indispensable part of the process of verification and the assumption has to be made that those who give the testimony are not lying. But this same assumption is often also made and considered legitimate in the case of statistical inquiries concerning Nature which, although theoretically they could be pursued without recourse to testimony, actually in many cases are carried on by means of it.

Testimony, however, presupposes that the terms used by the

witness and by the inquirer have the same meaning for both of them. How do we make sure they do? In the case of terms referring to Nature, community of meaning is established, in ultimate analysis, through the process of publicly pointing at perceptually public facts of the kind to which a given term is intended to refer. In the case of terms referring to Mind, this cannot be done. Community of meaning in their case is established in a less direct way, namely, in ultimate analysis, by attaching them to the sorts of states introspectively observable by any normal persons who are in given sorts of perceptually public physical conditions. The kind of psychical event called pain, for instance, is identified as the one introspection reveals to any normal person at times when, for example, his body is being cut, or burned, or bruised, etc.; and whether a person is normal or abnormal is itself a matter of whether the relations, such as likeness, or unlikeness, or causation, which he discovers introspectively among the psychical states identified in the manner just stated, and which he reports, are the same relations that most other persons introspectively find among them. This is the way in which for instance the abnormality called color-blindness is discovered.

Terms enabling us to talk to one another about events of psychical kinds thus are possible only through correlation between certain psychical events and certain perceptually public physical events. But from this it does not at all follow that the terms so established denote these physical events themselves. For to denote the latter we have certain *other* terms. For example, whereas the term 'anger' denotes a psychical event, the *other* terms, 'anger-behavior' and 'anger-provoking-situation', denote physical events. The upshot of these remarks is then that we do possess the language needed for taking testimony concerning the properties of other minds, and can therefore verify assertions as to the similarity of several minds in respect to a given property.

10. *Introspective psychologists have cultivated only a small part of the science of Mind.*—This, however, brings us to the objection that the science of Mind is not philosophy but introspective psychology. My answer to it in brief will be that philosophy includes what introspective psychologists have had to say, but that what they have had to say represents only a small part of the com-

prehensive science of Mind, which philosophy is. To regard introspective psychology as a part of philosophy is of course anything but a novel proposal, since it is on the contrary the traditional view. What is not a part of philosophy is the study of animal and human behavior and of its physiological mechanisms, which in recent years has arbitrarily called itself by a name, psychology, that hitherto had always designated something else. I may add in this connection that when some months ago I mentioned this to a group of behavioristic psychologists, their retort was that if I wished to claim introspective psychology as a part of philosophy, I was welcome to it, for *they* did not want it! I propose to accept the gift, but to point out now what a comprehensive science of Mind includes in addition to what introspective psychologists have discovered. To see what they have discovered, let us look into one of their textbooks. The one by the late Professor Titchener may be taken as representative. The larger number of its pages, we find, deal with the physical conditions under which certain kinds of introspectable facts, chiefly, sensations, occur; and this, of course, is not strictly introspective psychology but is a hybrid science which may be called psychophysics or psychophysiology. The proportion of pages devoted to introspective psychology proper, that is, to study of the relations of introspectable facts *to one another*, is relatively small, and the content of a science of Mind as represented in those relatively few pages would be rather meager. For about all it would include would be an inventory of the kinds of sensations and other mental states; an account of certain of the elements and dimensions of some complex mental states; and an account of the general laws according to which mental elements become discriminated or submerged, dissociated or associated. As Titchener himself suggests, a science of Mind that was limited to this "would stand to scientific psychology very much as the old-fashioned natural histories stand to modern textbooks of biology".<sup>4</sup> A scientific psychology, he says, must not only describe but also explain.

But then he strangely assumes that no mental process can cause another mental process; and since he also assumes, without argument, that no process in the nervous system can cause any mental

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, 38.

process, he concludes that the explanation of mental processes consists in tracing correspondences between them and nervous processes. The latter, he says, explain the former in the sense in which a map can be said to explain the country of which it is a map. But I submit, first, that, if this is explanation at all, it is certainly not explanation in the sense in which the term is used in the other sciences, where it means either the tracing of effects to their causes, or the deduction of known empirical laws from theoretical constructs. And, second, the search for correlations between psychological and physiological processes is anyhow not introspective psychology proper but, as already pointed out, psychophysiology.

But further, as regards Titchener's assumption that no mental process can cause another nor therefore explain another, I submit that on the contrary such causation is just what we do have in any case of association of ideas; and therefore in all the numberless mental connections constituted by cases of the relation of symbol to symbolized, or of sign to signified. Investigation of these very relations is what investigation of a given mind chiefly consists in; and establishment or alteration of such relations is what constitutes education of a mind. For symbols and signs, even the artificial ones of which a language consists, are not as it were a species of trained seals, which their trainer can endow with modes of behavior *of their own* by the process of laying down rules of combination and transformation. Such rules, obviously, are nothing whatever but *habits* either already possessed or to be adopted, and habits not of the words or symbols themselves, but of a particular mind or minds. These rules, in short, are simply some of the laws or properties that certain minds have or acquire, and the study of them is thus a part but only a part of the science of Mind, that is, of philosophy.

Another artificial limitation, which introspective psychologists have gratuitously imposed on the science of Mind, arises from the assumption that there can be no facts in Mind other than those susceptible of being introspectively observed. But to see how unscientific this assumption is, we need only consider what would be the parallel assumption in the case of Nature. It would be that there can be no facts in Nature other than those susceptible of being perceptually observed. As already pointed out, however, the

vast majority of the facts revealed by the natural sciences are not directly perceptible at all. They are accepted as facts, and as facts *in Nature*, only because postulation of them enables us to deduce facts in Nature already perceived or laws of Nature already discovered inductively, and additional ones that turn out to be verified by further observations of Nature. And I submit that in the science of Mind we have exactly as good a right, and the very same sort of right, to postulate and to call mental certain entities which introspection does not exhibit at all, but which similarly enable us to deduce facts that introspection has already revealed and additional ones that introspection eventually verifies. Examples of such entities would be the countless opinions, beliefs, and mental associations which all of us have, but of the having which we are totally unconscious at most times. They are properties of our minds, and our minds possess them even at times when they are not introspectively manifest, just as the property called combustibility is possessed by this sheet of paper even at times, such as the present, when it is not perceptually manifest. The realm of Mind, like that of Nature, thus includes vastly more than is ever directly revealed by observation of it.

II. *Psychological vs. e.g., epistemological questions.*—But there are certain questions, for example, those of the theory of knowledge or of ethics, which it is customary to contrast, as philosophical in a narrower sense, with certain others referred to as 'purely psychological'. If, as I claim, *both* these sorts of questions belong to the science of Mind, there is need to point out exactly where and how, within that science, we pass from the ones called purely psychological to the ones called epistemological, ethical, etc.

To do this, I must return to the matter of causation among psychical events, mentioned a moment ago, and call attention to what I should like to call *the interpretive activities*. By an interpretive activity, I mean a kind of psychical process consisting in this, that *occurrence of a psychical event of a given kind, in a psychical context of a given kind, regularly causes in us occurrence of a psychical event of a certain other kind*. This definition, it should be noted, stipulates nothing as to the character of the psychical events concerned, and therefore equally covers the cases where these events have the peculiar character called ob-

jective reference, and the cases where they do not have it. As so defined, a mode of interpretive activity is simply a psychical habit or a psychical disposition, and is the same thing as a property or law, whether acquired or native, of the particular mind concerned.

But now, among interpretive activities, there are certain ones called *appraisals*. How exactly they differ from others is an important question, but one into which we neither can nor need to inquire on the present occasion. For the contention I now wish to put forward is only that the cases of interpretive activity that *are* appraisals constitute the primitive subject-matter which distinguishes the so-called normative sciences, such as ethics or the theory of knowledge, from the part of the science of Mind whose problems are called 'merely psychological'. The whole of the theory of knowledge, for example, develops out of a persistent attempt to discover and describe exhaustively the differences between, and the presuppositions of, the sorts of appraisals expressed by such words as *erroneous* and *sound*, *mendacious* and *veracious*, *fallacious* and *valid*, etc. But since appraisal is a species of interpretive activity, the normative sciences, although they do go beyond the study of interpretive activities in general, are not independent of this study nor therefore of the study of mental events in general.

But the example of the theory of knowledge, just mentioned, may serve to call attention to the important fact that the sciences called normative are not, as sometimes thought, normative in the sense that they prescribe norms, but only in the sense that they discover and describe them. For a norm must not be confused with a desideratum or an aim. A norm is simply an appropriate form, the sort of form, namely, that an entity of a given sort has when it does satisfy a given sort of desire, or that an activity of a given sort has when it does cause the sort of effects that were aimed at. For example, the *aim* of the sort of activity called research is to attain knowledge, but the *norm* for this activity is *the manner of performing it* that regularly results in attainment of knowledge. What this norm is cannot be prescribed but has to be humbly discovered. A norm becomes itself an aim only in cases where, after we have discovered it, we then seek to impose it

upon something for which it is the norm but which does not conform to it, for instance, to impose it upon some activity of our own which has been unsuccessful because its form has been defective.

12. *Metaphysics and the science of Mind.*—To my contention that philosophy is the science of Mind, there still remains the objection that the branch of philosophy called metaphysics deals not only with Mind but also with Nature and with Reality in general. To deal with this objection I shall submit three remarks.

In the first place, I submit that in a large part of what has gone by the name of metaphysics the meaning of the terms employed is so vague and the transitions of thought so loose that the conclusions drawn have no title to the name of knowledge, even of probabilities. Such so-called metaphysics therefore seems to me to be just what Dr. Broad calls it, namely, moonshine. It is not really philosophy but only the manifestation of a methodological disease from which philosophy is gradually freeing itself. But the need to purge of this disease the philosophical problems it has most infected, namely those of the nature of Reality and of the relation of Nature to Mind, does not imply that these problems are spurious. I believe on the contrary that both are genuine and that both belong to the science of Mind, but I believe also that the true nature of each has been widely misconceived and therefore that each has to be restated before it can admit of solution.

To deal first with the problem of the nature of Reality, I believe that the adjectives, 'real' and 'unreal', describe no character that things have independently of human interest in them, but are on the contrary adjectives of human appraisal. But the sort of appraisal they describe is different from the appraisals mentioned already, in that the latter concerned the form of things or activities that were considered *as means to the satisfaction of some interest*, whereas the adjective 'real' voices appraisal of something as being *of a species which is itself an object of interest* at the time to the person who is calling it 'real'; and the adjective 'unreal', on the contrary, appraisal of something as belonging to a species of no interest to him at the time and therefore as to be ignored by him. This implies that a general statement as to the nature of Reality, that is, a statement of the form 'To be real is to be such and such',

does not formulate a hypothesis and is therefore not susceptible of being proved, disproved, or assigned a probability; but rather formulates simply the *criterion of interestingness* which we use or propose to use at a given time in appraising any given thing as interesting or uninteresting to us. To be using, or to choose, such a criterion is to be occupying, or to take, an ontological position. And since an ontological position is thus not a hypothesis but a ruling interest, an ontological position is not the sort of thing susceptible of being either erroneous or the opposite. An ontological position may be queer and unusual, or on the contrary widespread; or it may be perhaps foolish or wise in the long run; or it may be taken or given up or not taken; but it may not be either refuted, demonstrated, or shown to be more or less probable than another. That adoption of an ontological position consists in choice of a criterion of interestingness was evident already in the statement given a while ago of the ontological position which determines both the scope and the limits of natural science, the position, namely, that, for the natural scientist, to be real—that is, to be of interest—is to be either perceptually public, or implicit in what is so.

From these considerations it follows that ontology is the part of the science of Mind which inquires first, as we have just done, what exactly is represented by any statement of the form 'To be real is to be such and such', and further inquires what principal varieties of such ontological choices there may be, how they are mutually related, what consistency with each implicitly demands, and so on.

I come now to my last remark, which concerns the objection that, if philosophy inquires into the relation of Nature to Mind, it then is occupying itself not only with Mind but also with Nature. To deal with this objection, I must first mention briefly two sorts of problems concerning Nature that do not belong to philosophy. One is the problem of the relations of the parts of Nature *to one another*, which is the task of the natural sciences exclusively; and the other is that of discovering such correlations as there may be between specific kinds of mental events and specific kinds of nervous processes. This is the task of the hybrid science already referred to as psychophysiology, which from the start takes mental

events on the one hand, and nervous processes on the other, as somehow both known, and, without inquiring how each is known, occupies itself with the discovery of particular correlations between them.

But philosophy cannot take mental events on the one hand, and nervous processes or other parts of Nature on the other, as *independently* known. For in the absence of the mental events called sensations, we should not perceive or even be able to conceive such things as brains, nerves, sense-organs, or other parts of Nature. Nature is thus in ultimate analysis known to us at all only somehow *through* our sensations, in the cases, namely, when these are not themselves the center of our interest but, to borrow a phrase from Dr. Broad, are being *used by us to perceive with*. That is, there are times when the sensations we are having are making known to us not merely or even chiefly themselves, but somehow also something other than themselves as existing independently of them. The independently existing something somehow then made known to us by them is what we call a part of 'Nature' or an 'object of perception'; and, for philosophy, the problem of the relation between Mind and Nature is that of describing *without circularity*, that is, *otherwise than in terms of objects of perception*, what exactly the introspectable process called 'perceiving an object' consists in. That *this* problem genuinely belongs to the science of Mind is, I submit, evident from the mere formulation of it, irrespective of what in particular the solution of it may be.

I believe that although it is not one of the easier problems of philosophy, it is nevertheless perfectly soluble; but even a bare outline of what seems to me the solution of it would now be too long a story, for the time has come to rest my case. I have based it first on the distinction between the primitive and the derivative facts of a science; and further on the contention that the primitive facts distinctive of the natural sciences consist exclusively of facts susceptible of being perceptually public, whereas the primitive facts distinctive of philosophy consist exclusively of facts introspectively observable. If this contention is sound, it directly entails that the only reason why a naturalistic theory of so-called 'Mind' is not bad philosophy is that it is not philosophy at all

but natural science, and indeed good natural science. To my thesis that philosophy is the science of Mind, certain apparently formidable objections immediately suggested themselves. I have considered them and have attempted to show that, on careful scrutiny, each of them turns out to be without force. That, in the brief time at my disposal, I have succeeded in making this fully evident is hardly probable; and the most I can hope to have shown is therefore that the case for the contention that philosophy is the science of Mind is far stronger than appears at first sight, strong enough, perhaps, to merit much more searching examination of it than was possible in this address.

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## HUMAN NATURE AND THE PRESENT CRISIS\*

### I

AS I sit down to write what I hope may be the final version of this paper I recall with some qualms Hegel's remark that "thought is, after all, the most trenchant epitomist". For it is a bitter hazard that in cutting down the non-essential one may so easily cut out the essential; from the many thousands of possible ideas and fragments of ideas which have passed and are passing in the swift and elusive stream of consciousness how can one even hope to select and offer the right score or fifty? For the discussion, as Hegel puts it, must foreshorten its pictures by abstractions, and the abstractions may so easily prove empty, or what is worse, misleading. So, as Homer appeals to the goddess for aid, I must enlist the aid of your minds, to fill out from their abundance what is missing in the exposition and to safeguard against misunderstanding by their coöperative insight. For the crisis of which I am to speak is one that touches every one of us, not only as men and women, but particularly as philosophers. I fully agree with Dr. Rader's quotation in the Foreword to his recent book: "Today the issue is not between this or that school of philosophy, but the possibility of the survival of any philosophy at all."<sup>1</sup>

On the issue, so far from professing neutrality, I should shudder to be anything but partisan, with all the intensity I can muster. I prefer one type of human life and of world uncompromisingly over its antagonist. Even though the contemporary Armageddon should bring defeat to the party of my allegiance, I cannot imagine my allegiance to shift to the other side—that is to shift in truth and honesty; what weak human nature might do under duress is another question on which I dare not boast in these ominous days. Straining my perception of what is now in process and my imagination of what may come to pass, taking the most adequate overview I can command, without hesitation I set what may be epitomized as democracy, or the American Dream, to use a more sentimental expression, against the nightmare which now rides the storm in Europe and perhaps most of the rest of the world.

\*The presidential address to the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, The University of Washington, December 29, 1930.

<sup>1</sup>Melvin Rader, *No Compromise*. New York, 1939.

And yet I do not think I *know* which side will win; still more, I admit, or rather definitely insist, that I do not *know* which doctrine is ultimately true. I have used the word 'crisis' in my title, but I think no one knows, now or in so-called crises in general, whether crisis may not have already passed and *dénouement* be upon us. So the issue is to me a live one, in the dynamic stream of historic process, and in theory too. The final adjudication in both actuality and theory hangs upon that vast question which Kant proposes as the total subject-matter of philosophy: "What is Man?" On that ultimate query too, I am compelled to recognize that I do not know; I have no intellectual grasp of the problem adequate to guarantee a logical answer, and I know of no one who has. I am a pragmatist of sorts and a convinced instrumentalist, but I do not hold to 'the right to believe' nor do I intend to practice 'the will to believe', in the realm of the intellect. Both of these phrases seem to me to affront the inexorable essence of logic. Nor would I predicate a 'right to assume', but rather point to the obstinate pattern of our life as imposing on us incessantly the *necessity to assume* and to act upon our assumption. In brief I fully agree with Aristotle's great formula describing human life as "an *energeia*—a drive from within—according to reason, or at least not without reason". Or I might adapt, not adopt, Pascal, and say, The heart has reasons which the head must strive to know and must reckon with.

Consequently in preparing for this discussion I have paid attention mostly to the opposition. I have earnestly reconsidered that original philosophical charter of fascism—a noble and austere doctrine indeed, but fascism—Plato's *Republic*, the beauty and surpassing genius of which has made it, I think, one of the most dangerous items in the education of the western world. I have re-read Hobbes, perhaps the first notable modern advocate of the supremacy of the State; I have again reflected upon Fichte's burning zeal for "Deutschland über Alles", kindled by the cruel humiliation inflicted upon his country by Napoleon. Certainly I could not but sink myself again in the pages of the incomparable Hegel, as he with consummate skill and just sufficient mystery elevates the Hohenzellern Prussia to be "The March of God in the World". But most of all Nietzsche, clairvoyant of human nature even

though afflicted with an incurable *strabismus* which distorts the picture at every point. Him, I confess, I love dearly, first for his flawless sincerity, and then because he has thundered the most terrible denunciation against one of the two major foes of the democratic idea, that divine state which Hegel preaches. Nor have I omitted to read that most astounding of all things in the form of print, *Mein Kampf*, and to listen, sometimes with forced respect, to the contemporary voices of Mussolini and Hitler. In spite of all, I still see the theoretical issue as an open one.

I shall call the view of man and of human life which I am devoted to *democracy*, and this in spite of the luxuriant variety of meanings, both legitimate and ludicrous, which attach to the word. My own concept of democracy will mostly have to emerge in the course of the discussion, but at the very start I wish to do what I can to correct the prevalent notion that democracy is something mean or mediocre, suited to that drab delusion called the average man or average mind. In truth the democratic idea and the program of democracy are the most grandiose possible, so much so that the really powerful argument against them is their inordinate ambition and practical impossibility. I recommend Walt Whitman's introductory remarks in his *Democratic Vistas* as the most effective quasi-poetic expression of this, in which he recognizes the terrific obstacles and also the magnificence of the concept. Democracy, he says "is destined either to surmount the gorgeous history of feudalism, or else to prove the most tremendous failure of time . . . democracy can never prove itself beyond cavil, until it founds and luxuriantly grows its own forms of art, poems, schools, theology, displacing all that exists, or that has been produced in the past, under opposite influences."<sup>2</sup>

There are two violent attacks upon democracy today, one old and the other in a sense new; one at least has been out in the open since the beginning of history and the other has made its effective entrance in our own day. The former is, of course, the old doctrine that only the few, indeed the very few, are fit to govern, and that the preponderant mass are so inferior in intelligence and character that they must be governed without participating in the governing process themselves. It is not without significance

<sup>2</sup> *Democratic Vistas*, Everyman ed. with *Leaves of Grass*, 302-3.

that emphatic utterance of this view can be quoted from one of our own Revolutionary fathers, Alexander Hamilton's "Your People, Sir, is a great beast". The other attack is radically different, although the two are much in harmony, particularly in their common abhorrence of the democratic idea. It is the doctrine that not the human individual, the person, but the State, is the supreme end of our world and its historic process. That the individual is not, or at best only in an inferior sense, consummatory, but rather instrumental. "The State is the march of God in the world." For brevity I shall call the latter by its now familiar twentieth-century name, *totalitarianism*. The other is not so easy to christen; it calls itself preferably aristocracy, a very beautiful name with powerful argument residing in it. But this name begs the question at issue, for all forms of social order and government equally require that the 'best' should hold office and administer. So I am compelled to adopt another name which is itself quite factual and non-committal, *oligarchy*; for oligarchy of course means precisely that the few should govern. It is true that the name oligarchy also carries argument within it, but by a sort of accident and not by virtue of the word itself. I regret to be involved in any kind or degree of 'argument by epithet', but it must be so; after all democracy is in no wise responsible for the bad odor which the word oligarchy has acquired in the course of history. I hope the word may be deodorized for the present discussion and held to its plain intrinsic meaning.

So far as the first of these two attacks is concerned, that of oligarchy, I shall of necessity epitomize as trenchantly as possible; partly because I had the privilege of presenting a paper on the subject to this Association some years ago, but mainly because it has been pretty thoroughly dealt with in general, so that probably all savable souls are already saved in this respect. The major fallacy in the oligarchic doctrine has been an erroneous anthropology, the classic statement of which is found in Plato's *Republic*, the doctrine that a human community or the race itself consists of three distinct classes, each marked by its inherent nature: a very small class, the wise-good, at the top; a second class, larger but still small, below them, the brave-loyal; and the preponderant mass of the inferior and unworthy at the bottom. It

is now clear, since Galton and a host of followers, that *the masses are in the middle*, good or bad, wise or unwise, worthy or unworthy. The race is not built on a pyramidal pattern, but rather on something like a double pyramid, the two bases being placed in contact with each other. Of course this is just one of the facts which emerge from the immense statistical inquiries springing from Galton's hints. For it is also clear that the wise may not be good, nor the loyal brave. In the place of the comfortable vision of the little group of simon-pure lovers of wisdom blessing their subjects with benevolent despotism, the realistic experience of history is far more after the fashion of Benjamin Franklin's comment on what was probably one of the very best governing groups ever assembled, the Constitutional Convention:

When you assemble a number of men [he writes] to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views.

Still another source of fallacy in the oligarchic view springs from the very nature of stratified society, that the barriers fixed between the classes render it impossible for the members of one class to gain any sound and reliable knowledge of the essential character and capacities of members of other classes. Particularly are the élite unqualified to pass judgment on those below them in the social order. The 'masses' smell bad, are not clean, their clothes are shabby, even ragged; they are, to the eyes of those above them, stupid, illiterate, even lazy and dishonest. I know of no better instance of this than Shakespeare's plays. The very names of common people are insulting. And the curious fact is that the poet's own father and mother were no better in the social scale than many of the characters so derided in the plays. But the élite alone are vocal, the masses have no voice; so the erroneous judgment of the élite becomes the opinion of mankind.

I have no idea of even hinting at any foolish doctrine of equality of capacity, any more than an equality of height or skin-color, but do emphatically maintain that the traditional view over the centuries is grossly in error and that the truth as and when worked out gives no support to the oligarchic view. It is significant that intelligent members of the so-called masses never for

one moment admit the inherent incapacity and inferiority of their class. Any sound democracy recognizes that there are certain indispensable requisites for admission to the status of being human, and that not all who are 'born of woman' possess these qualifications, even in minimum form, certainly not the idiots and imbeciles, and perhaps not the next upper stratum of the very dull. Just what proportion of any community, the United States for example, or of the whole race, must be excluded from full civic function is as yet not merely undetermined but actually uninvestigated. Let no one however suppose that this admission on the part of the democrat obliterates the distinction between his doctrine and program and those of the aristocrat: the two are still in flat antagonism, for aristocracy seeks to keep government in the hands of as few as possible while democracy seeks to include as many as possible. To this end democracy must assiduously foster every means of raising the capacity of the whole community, including, *par excellence*, education, social reform, eugenics.

We may now move upon the citadel of oligarchical theory: that the alleged top class and it alone is fit to govern, and that the rest are fit only to be governed. For this doctrine can still be held even after admitting that the masses are in the middle, although only with greatly increased difficulty. The maxim of this doctrine at its pious best is: "Government by the wisest and best for the good of all." These are good words, but mean nothing until we know by whose superwisdom and plenary power these wisest and best rulers are identified and inducted into office over us. Plato evades the question, and we may not blame him for doing so; it is too hazardous. Throughout the account of the founding of the New State he keeps saying '*We* must do so and so, *we* shall do so and so', but never is the identity of this '*We*' explicitly stated. Yet in all such schemes for putting government safely into the hands of any chosen few, this is the crucial question. In actual history there is no mystery about it: the Bolsheviki, crushing the first Russian Revolution, Black Shirts marching on Rome, Brown Shirts taking over Germany, always with appropriate liquidation. For ourselves and our own United States it is painfully uncertain when the farce-comedy of Silver Shirts and the effrontery of German-American Bunds shall eventuate in some 'party' and

'party-line' with marchers enough in shirts of some hue and weapons in their hands, to take the republic out of our fumbling democratic hands into their firm dogmatic oligarchy. There are always the 'industrialists of the Ruhr' to furnish abundant economic aid, and, at the other end of the social scale, more than enough despair and hatred of the *status quo*; while in the background the great body of the people, engrossed until too late with their own private concerns, fall victims to violence, and the 'small group', the 'We' who must and shall do what is needful, have their way, and the new regime is upon us. Of all infantile babblings "It cannot happen *here*" records the lowest point.

Here, I think, we come to the very nub of our own theory of democracy and of our own grounds for adhering to it through thick and thin. To be self-governing, we must insist, is of the essence of man. He is the one type of concrete existence who has been, as it were, *let in on his own career and destiny*. He looks before and after, and not only 'longs for what is not', but sets himself to bring it to pass. This is again Aristotle's *energeia*, drive from within, as the basic and substantive element in human life, which we humans unhesitatingly choose as against any sort of divine "moveless contemplation". Long before Nietzsche or anybody else invented the phrase "Will to Power", the actual will to power was an open secret in the stream of human behavior. How it shines out in that only genuine natural man, the child, whose favorite cry is 'I can do that; let *me* do that!' The very same propensity which impels the oligarch to grasp for governing power will make his fellowmen resent and reject his claims. If nothing else avails against the spreading rule of dictatorships surely in some long last this mainspring of man's nature will. It is but a corollary to this that democracy seeks (I am partly quoting John Dewey) to train every member in competency "to plan and execute his own career and share in planning and executing the career of the society to which he belongs". This is perhaps the most concise and effective formula for democracy, so far as its political aspect is concerned.

The proposal that every individual should actually participate in planning and executing is at once utterly commonplace and utterly visionary. It is commonplace because it forms a sort of all-

pervading major premise for the mass of our national ideology, in school and out; and also because it is the only possible justification of the extension of the suffrage to practically all of the adult population. So, however visionary, it still does not float in the stratosphere: the political stage is at least set for its entry. That it is visionary, unexistent, even impossible in anything like our present economic and social order, certainly need not be labored. "The prime condition of a democratically organized public", says Dewey, "is a kind of knowledge and insight which does not exist."<sup>3</sup> "Thus we presume to write", says Whitman, "upon things that exist not, and travel by maps as yet unmade and a blank." "But", he adds, "the throes of birth are upon us." It is, of course, not merely new knowledge and insight that are needed, but new economic conditions, new political devices, a new type of education, and most of all a new morale or spiritual endowment. Let me quote from one other eminent thinker, Bertrand Russell, in a recent short essay on democracy:

You cannot get any kind of improvement in the world, or any kind of good life, without a basis in the emotions . . . the only sort of emotional basis is what I should call kindly feeling . . . a wish, not only in regard to your friends and the people you know, but in regard to mankind at large, that as far as possible they should be happy, enlightened, able to live a decent sort of life.<sup>4</sup>

I here offer to all would-be promoters of the democratic idea, certainly including myself, campaign advice no. 1: not merely to recognize, but emphatically to declare, that *democracy makes inordinate demands upon human nature*. Let there be no time-wasting debate upon that score. At the same time, I wish to make it quite clear that it is my view that democracy is the sole and only political or social scheme *which does justice to human nature*. The antinomy is superficial.

Government by the few in whose selection the mass of the people have had no part seems to be culminating in our own day over a large part of the inhabited world. It proves to be a culmination also of arrogant nationalism, of violence, of ruthless destruction of the opposition, even within its own body, and of blatant repudiation of the feeble but promising rudiments of human mu-

<sup>3</sup> *The Public and Its Problems* (New York), 1927, 166.

<sup>4</sup> *Journal of the National Educational Assoc.*, April, 1939, 98.

tuality and coöperation. Perhaps because the exclusive right of the few against the many is by this time a losing cause, these newest schemes have shifted their ground to what may be a more defensible position, the proposition that neither few nor many nor even all, considered as individuals, even as persons, possess any inalienable rights, but that the State is supreme and all men and women simply subordinate and instrumental to this mystic totality. This is the actual present crisis.

I will close this section of the discussion by offering a point of paramount importance to the problem as a whole. The social order itself, whether autocratic or democratic, is potent, one might almost say omnipotent, in determining the very nature of its members. "Social arrangements", says Dewey, "laws, institutions, are made for man . . . but they are not means of obtaining something for individuals, not even happiness. They are means of *creating* individuals."<sup>5</sup>

Surely this is the most ominous aspect of the scene in central and eastern Europe today, with its Hitler Youth and Balilla, and its universal regimentation of the life-pattern of human raw material. The totalitarian state, like the Jehovah of old, is "making man in its own image", and the plastic stuff of youth is being molded into the destined shape. In this way the prophet fulfils his own prophecies! This is the supreme ground for the democrat's undying opposition to oligarchy; it does, indeed, pervert the youth.

I must confess, for one, that I find this newest turn in affairs, the state versus the individual, far more disturbing than the old threat of the few versus the many. Worst of all is the suspicion that the Hobbeses and Hegels may after all be right, ontologically as it were, and the huge monster called the State *may* be god, and may, Moloch-like, swallow us up, its mere creatures. To a convinced and thoroughgoing evolutionist, which I confess myself to be, there is a horrid quirk of logic in such a theory. Physics and biology in their account of all existence from without, with subjectivity exorcised as fully as may be and the maximum of objectivity achieved, exhibit an unbroken drive of progressive composition and integration, from electron to atom, atom to molecule, molecule to cell, and so on up to organism and species.

<sup>5</sup> *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, 194.

At the very top of the biological series the individual is ruthlessly sacrificed to the species, and perhaps the species to something like a total of all life as such.

No less does the history of modern Europe, and to an increasing extent of the world as a whole, exhibit an ever-advancing tendency to the corporate. The rise of nationalism may be looked upon as nothing else but the emergence of a new type of historical existence, that is of the nation as a self-determining and even, at least figuratively, self-conscious entity. The older political aggregates such as the empires of the Orient or of Rome, were radically different and on a lower level. The Saracen empire begins to show the new character; but it comes to fuller and fuller realization in the rise of the new European nations: Spain, France, England, latest, and most marked today, Germany and Italy. Somewhere as an enigmatic variant is the new Russia, the USSR.

Even Kant, in his deepest heart a genuine democrat, as I am compelled to hold, unwittingly sets the stage for Hegel's most extreme state-worship: for Kant announces a categorical imperative to be supreme governor of man's life, and all Hegel has to do is to supply the missing link, the Emperor to issue the imperative, the State itself. So the State sits upon the throne to decree ethical principles for the conduct of its members, and bestow upon them whatever dignity and value they may possess. The preface to the *Philosophy of Right* breathes this idea throughout: the individual's will, his native impulsions, his desires, his own personal ambitions, are demoted to the level of incompetent, almost irrelevant "subjectivity". "But feeling", we read, "which seeks its own pleasure, and conscience, which finds right in private conviction, regard the law as their most bitter foe . . . yet the law is the reason of the object, and refuses to feeling the privilege of warming itself at its private hearth." Hegel goes on to deal firmly with the philosopher in particular: "Still less", he writes, "is it a surprise that government has at last turned its attention to this false philosophizing. With us philosophy is not practiced as a private art, as it was by the Greeks, but has a public place, and therefore should be employed only in the service of the State."

It is only a slight digression here to note a modern instance of the degradation of philosophy, in its broader sense, by totalita-

rianism: the case of the distinguished Austrian physicist, who continued to hold his post in the University of Graz under the Nazi occupation, but only after he wrote an appropriately humble letter, in which he explains:

that he has not hitherto taken the active part expected of him in the National Socialist movement but is now glad to be reconciled to it. . . . Well wishing friends [he continues] who overestimate my importance consider it right that the repentant confession which I made to them should be made in public. I too belong to those who seize the outstretched hand of peace, because . . . I have misjudged up to the last the real will and the true destiny of my land. I make this confession readily and joyfully.<sup>6</sup>

Could there be a more pathetic, tragic case of "curses, not loud but deep, mouth-honor, breath, which the poor heart would fain deny, but dare not"?

There is some consolation even if no great logical assistance in the contradictions and confusions to be found in the documents of totalitarianism. Even high priest Hegel hedges with statements which can well be interpreted in favor of the individual person, and which are hard to reconcile with his major doctrine of the absolute supremacy of the state. "The history of the world", he says, "is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom".<sup>7</sup> And again: "Subjective freedom is the principle of the whole modern world—the principle that all essential aspects of the spiritual totality should develop and attain their right."<sup>8</sup> It is significant that Hegel chides Plato in two separate passages for his failure to recognize "the principle of self-dependent and in itself infinite personality of the individual, the principle of the subjective freedom". Particularly he objects to Plato's provision that the state shall determine the individual's occupation, whereas, Hegel says, "subjective freedom demands free choice for individuals".<sup>9</sup> On such terms totalitarianism takes on a milder aspect.

It is certainly small comfort the totalitarians get from the Teutonic major prophet and hero Nietzsche:

A state? What is that? Open your ears unto me, for now I will say my word unto you concerning the death of peoples. A state is called

<sup>6</sup> *School and Society*, June 4, 1938, 732.

<sup>7</sup> *Introd. to Philosophy of History*, ap. Loewenberg, *Selections*, 361.

<sup>8</sup> *Philosophy of Right*, Dyde trans., 281. However, I have preferred Loewenberg's rendering as found in his *Selections*, 448.

<sup>9</sup> *Philosophy of Right*, 189, 252.

the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lieth also; and this lie creepeth from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people.' It is a lie! Creators were they who created peoples, and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served life. Destroyers, are they who lay snares for many, and call it the state: they hang a sword and a hundred cravings over them. . . . But the state lieth in all languages concerning good and evil; and whatever it saith it lieth; and whatever it hath it hath stolen. . . . 'On the earth there is nothing greater than I: it is I who am the regulating finger of God'—thus roareth the monster. And not only the long-eared and short-sighted fall upon their knees!<sup>10</sup>

Violent and subjective as this diatribe is, in Nietzsche's best soap-box style, yet here as so often he sees and passionately feels the very essence of things, in this case the basic peril and threat of the State: that its distinctive character is force, or rather, to be quite explicit, violence. Tragically enough his "Will to Power" has become in the minds of his political disciples nothing short of a Will to Violence; yet he himself, at least as I interpret him, never meant that. At any rate, it is the essential rôle of force in the State, which becomes violence whenever the subjective freedom of the individual dares to resist it, that makes the State potentially and often actually so shocking a monster. The State in history gets its power as it may, with or without consent. Once grasped, the power easily turns to violence, not by any means only toward its enemy states but more against its members. The state 'arrests', 'throws into prison', penalizes, executes. Its *force majeure* dictates over life and property. To protect its own superexistence, the existences of its members become pawns in the game. If the State in such a rôle is, as Hegel would have it, the march of God in the world, then woe is man to dwell in the world. We must, for ourselves, first hold that the State is to be neither Nietzsche's diabolical monster nor Hegel's supreme and all devouring Deity, but something far different from either, the most grandiose instrument for the fostering of essential human values.

From a hard, clear, practical angle the final objection to the divine supremacy of the State is that 'it has no hands to do its work except human hands'. The flag, the parliament house, the hall of justice, the throne itself, are but symbols and utensils, or even mere gadgets. When I meet the State I meet another human being, tax-collector, sheriff, turnkey, even electrocutionist; each

<sup>10</sup> Thus Spake Zarathustra, XI, "The New Idol".

of them jerks his thumb over his shoulder to his master and authority, the 'government'. When I appeal from any underling who is ready to execute upon me, again I find only . . . still other men, forked radishes like myself. And all too often they do not smell of either goodness or wisdom. *L'état, c'est moi!* is as true for any traffic-officer or game-warden as for the Grand Monarque himself. Let who will prate that the state is "self-conscious ethical substance"; I take exception to every term. The self-consciousness or any consciousness whatever is pure unadulterated mysticism. The ethics is against history and, curiously enough, is indignantly denied by the modern state-worshippers. The substance turns out on close examination to be not anything called state, by no means divine, but human, all too human.

The same trend to corporateness manifests itself in the economic realm, and nowhere more than in our own country, which we would fain still hold to be the stronghold of individualism. The swiftness of the spread of corporate control of all economic processes is nothing less than breath-taking. Abraham Lincoln, in one of his significant excursions into the economic field, could say with substantial truth that "A few men own capital . . . and hire another few to labor for them. A large majority belong to neither class, neither work for others nor have others work for them . . . there is not, of necessity, any such thing as the free laborer being fixed to that condition for life." Those days were already passing when Lincoln spoke and are gone now, we may suppose forever. Today the majority work, if they work at all, for 'others'; but those 'others' are not individuals, they are corporations, totalities, and, be it noted, corporations of ceaselessly expanding dimensions. The true name of the present form of economic order is no longer capitalism, but *corporationism*.

(To avoid possible misunderstanding I state here that, however dubious and questionable these trends may be, I am not tilting at any windmills and am in no way arguing for turning the clock back toward household industry or the fragmentizing of the economic process. On the contrary the rise of large-scale production seems to me the natural concomitant of modern machine and power production, and I not only believe in the machine and in mechanical power, but look upon the achievements of machinery

as quite indispensable to the advance of democracy, by lifting the intolerable burdens of production from the shoulders of men. It is jumping to my own conclusions a bit to add that the road to any humane general social order, which to me of course means a democratic order, lies not in the destruction but in the taming of the monsters which we have created, both the economic corporation and the state.)

Moreover, it is a commonplace that the function of government in our order has burst its old bonds and is expanding into unprecedented forms and magnitude. The State is becoming God to Americans as never before. This is a plain fact without any intrinsic partisan bearing, but certainly a fact of profound significance. Thus corporationism, both economic and political, is coming home to us. Again, and here I must epitomize ruthlessly, we are also being perturbed as never before by the weakness and vices of individualism, both rugged, as for long hitherto, and now with the increase in popular participation in government, and the vast expansion of governmental subsidy of individual lives, also of 'ragged' individualism. The rugged individualists want the ragged deprived of political power, while the ragged individualists want the rugged deposed from their economic dictatorship. I want to read here one of the most moving of all the utterances of the great Hegel, because it seems to picture our own 'epoch' in these United States, as well as the world-epoch:

For the rest [he writes] it is not difficult to see that our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit of the age has broken with the world as it has hitherto existed, and with the old ways of thinking and is in the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past and set about its own transformation. . . . But this new world is realized just as little as a new-born child.<sup>11</sup>

In the light of these things, then, our concern should be the rigorous scrutiny of our own position to find if we may where it misses the hard objective structure of reality, and, if it does, to reconstruct our theory and our practice. In this task I have found the greatest stimulus and challenge in a little-known work—too little known, it seems to me—Professor E. Jordan's *Forms of Individuality*.<sup>12</sup> The book knows too much history and juris-

<sup>11</sup> *Phenomenology of Mind*, preface.

<sup>12</sup> E. Jordan, *Forms of Individuality*. Indianapolis, 1927.

prudence for my grasp, and even where this excuse fails I find the exposition difficult. So to my testimony of admiration I ought to add apology for quite possible misinterpretation. There will be no question, as Jordan's views are examined, of his close relation to Hegel. But he brings the problem out of the foggy air of German idealism and into the arena of the economic and political struggles of today, at least up to the date of the book, 1927. It seems to me indeed, that the huge happenings to us and the world since, let us say, 1929, greatly add to the importance of the book.

Again in trenchant epitome, Jordan's views appear as follows: that the Greeks enjoyed a certain simple, almost naïve objectivity, but that all cultures after them suffer from varying forms of individualist subjectivity. Objectivity, or reality, is to be found only in the *corporate*. The individualist vice of our own day is the elevation of *interest*, a subjective function of the person, into *right*, an objective function of corporate existence. It is true, he says, that the term used in making these claims is usually *right*, but this "right is justified, explained and blessed, in the mere fact that an individual *claims* it, finds it with an accidental status in his own mental processes" (17). But "Politics", he says, "as the science of *human* nature, is the rational ordering of the objective institutions of human life, and not a fanciful fitting together of subjective states of 'need', 'want', etc." (37).

Thus the key concept in Jordan's theory is the corporate, or as he calls it, *corporeity*. The forms of individuality take their place in a sort of hierarchy, but always find their essence in the corporeity out of which they emerge and into which they are subsumed. "The individual is an object whose constitution is its history and whose end is the institutionalizing of that history into forms [in] which, through their universality, the individuality shares its life with other individualities. . . . The essence of individuality is *corporeity*" (185, 187).

For our inquiry, however, in the examination of the conflicting claims of democracy and totalitarianism, it is the sharp negative in Jordan's doctrine that concerns us: that the human individual, the person in the ordinary sense, enjoys *no prerogative status*, but is simply one in a graded series of individualities, and moreover by no means the highest.

The outstanding stages [we read, pp. 302-3] in the compendious whole of individuality are man, the incorporate institution, and the state. And the progressional or growth character of their relations to each other is indicated by the organism at the lower end as the form which is just approaching 'personality', and the vague or nebulous 'world-state' or 'humanity' or 'kingdom of God' to which the process approaches as the as yet only partially incorporate form. But each stage is fully incorporate with reference to the next lower; and each higher stands as the undefined or unembodied goal or end for all preceding stages.

Still more decisive and sweeping is the following:

No difference of primary quality of content is discoverable in individuality in any of its stages, and the ascription of any peculiar quality to it in a particular stage loses itself in the mystery of uniqueness (298).

Quite naturally and consistently Jordan demurs to the traditional distinction between 'legal' and 'natural' persons in jurisprudence, insisting that the corporation is no more corporate, and no less natural, than the individual person.

This denial of prerogative status to the human individual, to you and me as men or women, this demotion of the human individual to a mere stage in a hierarchical process, and moreover a relatively low stage, seems to me to pose the most profound of all subsidiary questions in that great inquiry which lies behind and conditions all the problems that can concern us, the question "What is Man?" Precisely because my own predilection is so decidedly in favor of a prerogative status for man, even for the individual man, it is necessary for me to make clear to myself as well as to my fellow-thinkers that I admit the real and valid nature of the question. I might add here, even though it is logically premature, that I suspect the question of being logically quite indeterminable, and so capable of adjudication only by some other court of appeal, probably what we may term the will. To Jordan's impressive indictment of the evils of individualism, I add similar argument from Hegel, as for example his statement that "when independent particularity gives free rein to the satisfaction of need, caprice, and subjective liking, it destroys in its extravagance both itself and its substantive conception". And as I then reflect upon the ravages of individualism in our own socio-economic order, I can but ask whether the totalitarian regimes, with all

their horrors, might not after all be the blind and yet substantially right revolt against these evils.

I have read at length from Jordan because he seems to me to present the opposing case in the most thoroughgoing and close-knit logical form. If his logic were complete, final, irrefragable, the case would have to be closed. But of course I cannot conceive of any scheme of proof which could achieve finality in so vast a dialectic. Hence I am not bound to go over to a position so antagonistic to my whole scheme of thought and action; but I am justified in seeking all valid countervailing argument. That argument lies in part in the claims of subjectivity, beginning, perhaps, with the bare proposition that subjectivity is entitled to a hearing in the investigation of the nature of man and of human life, and most of all in the adjudication of the issue between the individual and the corporate.

In the line of pure reason, then, I next point to a place in Jordan's own exposition, where the edge of a logical wedge may be inserted, as it seems to me. In delineating the processes of action and history, he says:

The highest aims then are often reached outside of and in spite of the established and customary machinery, which invariably represents superseded purpose. It is then in the incidental methods and 'free' fictive institutions, the institutions which grow up out of actual facts and imagination process, which form the constitutions of states that are real and which can claim respect (258).

In this statement I underline the word *imagination*. It seems clear that the element denoted by this word is essential to the process of history and of the evolution of the hierarchy of corporate forms. But where is imagination to be found? Where, indeed, unless we launch into pure mysticism, except in the conscious mind of the human individual, the natural person? And what, we must next ask, is the nature and function of imagination?

Let us admit, with Jordan, at least for the purpose of the argument, that "human beings are thrown together and caused to take some form as a body by the sheer force of external circumstances", i.e., by nature in the sub-human sense (243); and, with reservations, even that there is such a thing as "the effective power of the corporate will, or its executive functioning *independently* of

the individual will" (259; Jordan's italics). Even so, it is still open to us to hold as possible a distinctive operation of imagination, to use this particular term, an operation such as to be truly initiative or origivative; and we may even postulate such an operation, as justified by the body of fact involved and as serving a vital function in our general theory of human life. It is now in order to drive deeper our wedge in behalf of the claims of the subjective.

To say that I shrink from this task is to put it very mildly, for I know of no more subtle and elusive problem than the ultimate nature of the subjective and the objective. Hegel half the time and Jordan all the time reduce subjectivity to invalidity and error. Descartes bases his whole scheme on pure subjectivity, as perhaps does Spinoza. And whereas these two latter can see knowledge and truth in the superstructure, the Protagorist uses the same premise to demolish the possibility of truth. Kant seems to take the same main track when he regretfully demonstrates that all our supposed objective science is subjective. The one thing that must be admitted by all is Perry's "egocentric predicament", that we live and move and have our being in our own . . . what shall I say, our own minds, our own consciousness, our own subjectivity? The vice of subjectivity is also its virtue, that it *is* subjective, *my own* and not another's, not any other's.

This is close quarters with our final problem: What is Man? Well, it begins to appear that there will have to be at least two definitory criteria, individuality, that is subjectivity, *and* sociality, that is, objectivity. Man is, it would seem, on the one hand, a "windowless monad", and on the other a "*politikon Zoon*", a social being. Dewey, the very prophet of the social, still says "Existentially speaking, a human individual is distinctive opacity of bias and preference conjoined with plasticity and permeability of needs and likings".<sup>13</sup> Add however, that the "opacity" is luminous, indeed that it sheds upon us the only light our existence can enjoy. It is true, as Dewey continues, that "The human individual in his opacity of bias is in so far doomed to a blind solitariness". But without his luminous opacity he is . . . nothing at all. It is the

<sup>13</sup> *Experience and Nature*, 242.

luminousness, opaque or not, that in the last analysis we are. It is the luminousness of the human individual that the worship of corporeity would extinguish, especially in its contemporary concrete form of totalitarianism, and it is the luminousness that democracy is set to foster and rejoice in.

I have, almost accidentally, keyed this discussion to Jordan's word *imagination*, and it is a good word. But of course no word nor any lexicon of words can compass the fullness of the individual in his conscious aspect. I happen to hold, especially in the light of now approved psychology, that Descartes' "I think", at least his more precise "cogito", is less of the essence of man than an 'I will', and am glad to find after the decision that the 'I will' is the sounder approach to the desired political and social corollary. Again, no moveless contemplation, but a dynamic working out of purposes and striving for ends is the thing most necessary; the "cogito" finds ample room within this space. But there are other symbols of the inner life as legitimate and impressive as thought and will and imagination: aspirations, for example, hope and fear, joy and sorrow, a quite indefinite catalogue. We have to do here with all of man's nature in one of two aspects, its obverse or reverse. The socio-political bearing is well expressed by Walt Whitman:

For after the rest is said, after the many time-honored and really true things for subordination, experience, rights of property, etc., have been listened to and acquiesced in—after the valuable and well-settled statement of our duties and relations in society is thoroughly coned over and exhausted—it remains to bring forward and modify everything else with the idea of that Something a Man is.<sup>34</sup>

If it is challenged at this point that the logic offered is too simple for the immense issues involved, I agree; and if further I am asked if I think it is decisive in the present state of the discussion, I answer that it seems to me valid with respect to Jordan's own dialectic, but again that it must in the very nature of things be inadequate to the main problem; I do not conceit myself to have "settled 'oti's business", like Browning's Grammarian. Nevertheless, and this is my ground for offering it to myself and others, it does at least keep the door open for the postulation of the pre-

<sup>34</sup> *Democratic Vistas*, Everyman's Library ed., with *Leaves of Grass*, 312.

rogative status of the human person, without which a theory of human nature and human life seems to me the play without Hamlet.

As I reach this point I cannot escape a certain sense of fighting windmills, for the simple reason that my own total scheme of thought and action is based upon and conditioned by the very prerogative status of the human person for which I have been arguing. But when I remind myself of Hegel's unqualified apotheosis of the State and of the great mass of concurring theory, and still more when I contemplate the stupendous historical rôle of corporate dominance over the individual, culminating in our own day in unexampled force, I am then convinced that the question is pertinent and the issue grave; I think, paramount. When I speak of the historical rôle I mean to include far more than the extreme or dramatic phases of autocratic governments and social orders and to include no less the pervasive control of the corporate in democratic regimes as well. And when I speak of culmination in our own day I refer not only to the terrific apparition of totalitarianism in Europe, but also to the growing corporate control of economic life in our own American society.

It may help to convey more fully my own view of the problem and the present crisis if I frankly avow my horror of the very idea of the supremacy of the state, even the world-state, to say nothing of lesser and meaner corporate forms, over the supremacy of the person. I am profoundly averse myself to being a mere molecule or cell, or even a mere organ in some other corporeity, however grandiose; and naturally I have the same horror on behalf of my friends and associates. All the parables of Jugger-nauts and Frankensteins and Leviathans are inadequate to symbolize the devastating ruin of precious values which the concept seems to me certain to wreak, and which certainly we can see proceeding before our eyes.

So, finally, I can image the ever fuller realization of the nature of man only in a democratic order. A Superman or a clique of Supermen housed on the same planet with a mob of submen is a logical contradiction and an ethical monstrosity, altogether too much like the worst scenes in the drama of our past and present. Nietzsche himself suffered the worst pains of nostalgia for com-

panions, what shall we say, like himself? At least like something very vague and nebulous which he dreamed of as the Superman. Aristotle, meditating on the very bottom character of mankind, sees that a solitary individual could not be man but must be either God or beast. The sole sufficing answer, since we do not want to be either God or beast, is a society in which barriers are lowered and communication freed and fostered to the fullest extent, to the end that human nature may bring to full fruition both the common life of the "beloved community" and the precious uniqueness of individual personality.

EDWARD O. SISSON

REED COLLEGE

## PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 1939

### THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF OFFICERS

#### *American Council of Learned Societies*

The twentieth annual meeting of the Council was held in Washington, D.C., on January 27-28, 1939. The Association was represented by its delegates Professors G. R. Morrow and C. J. Ducasse. The latter was elected to membership on the Executive Committee of the Council. Since then he has attended four meetings of the Committee in Washington and will attend a fifth one in the middle of January. The meeting of the Council, at the end of January, will be in Philadelphia.

It may be appropriate to remind the members of the Association that one among others of the activities of the Council consists in the awarding of fellowships and study-aids to scholars in the training stage. These awards are in varying amounts and as a rule supplement awards made by the universities with which the applicants are connected. The Council also makes grants in aid of research and awards assistance to publication of scholarly works in the field of the humanities, which could not be published commercially. The Advisory Board of the Council has awarded grants to assist publication of the following works of special interest to the Association: David Bidney, *The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza*; T. M. Greene, *Art and the Aesthetic Experience*.

It will be of interest to the Association that the Director of the Council, Dr. Waldo G. Leland, who has represented the Council each year at the meetings of the International Union of Academies, was elected president of the Union for a term of three years at its 1937 meeting in Brussels.

#### *Committees*

##### *Permanent Committee on Bibliography*

Since the report submitted by the Committee last year concerning the status of the Bibliography of Philosophy (1902-1932), the principal thing to report is that, in view of the fact that the project has had W.P.A. assistance, the Committee thought that the printing of the bibliography by W.P.A. labor might be a possibility. Application was made accordingly, but the Committee now regrets to report that it has recently been denied.

More recently information has come that it might be possible to print the bibliography by the photo-offset process with a great saving in the cost of publication. The Committee is now engaged in giving close study to the possibility of publishing the bibliography by this method.

The Committee wishes to report also that it is now exploring the possibility, as at least an *interim* measure, of a bibliographical service to the members of the Association by Columbia University, on the basis of the card-index in which is embodied the now compiled bibliography for the years 1902-1932.

The work on the *Bibliographie de la Philosophie*, of which several numbers have been published by the Institut International de Collaboration Philosophique, has of course been interfered with by the war, Mr. H. L. Kauffmann, the bibliographer, being now in the army. At the time this report is being written the only information this Committee has is that Professor Åke Petzäll will try to do anything he can to keep things going, but is at present uncertain as to what can be done. He himself is now a Professor at Lund, Sweden, and it is conceivable that Mlle. Kreisler, the assistant of Dr. Kauffmann, could be brought to Lund if that would insure the continuity of the *Bibliographie*.

In this Committee's report for 1938 it was stated that the Institut was about to undertake the gathering of a file of biographical and bibliographical information concerning persons working in the field of philosophy. So far as your Committee has heard, nothing has been done in connection with it, and it is unlikely that anything will be done for some time as things now are. The Committee believes, however, that a "Register" of the American Philosophical Association, similar to that which the Psychological Association and other societies publish, would be of great value. Information, for example, as to the academic history, the principal publications, and the fields of chief interest, of each member of the Association would be useful to his fellow members and in particular to department or university committees on new appointments, to chairmen of departments, and to appointing or other administrative officers, when confronted with the task of selecting a man to fill a vacancy. The Committee therefore suggests that the Association authorize it to circulate among the members of the Association a questionnaire to elicit the sort of information that is usually embodied in such registers, with a view to eventually publishing it in as inexpensive a form as possible; and that the Committee be allowed to draw upon the treasury of the Association for the postage and mimeographing expenses incidental to the gathering of the information and the bringing of it up-to-date from time to time as necessary to maintain its serviceability.

For the Committee,

C. J. Ducasse, *Chairman*

#### *Carus Lectures*

The fifth series of the Paul Carus Foundation Lectures was delivered by Professor Evander Bradley McGilvary on the occasion of the joint meeting of the Eastern and Western Divisions of the American Philosophical Association held at Columbia University on December 27 to 29. In development of his general subject, "Toward a Perspective Realism", Professor McGilvary presented three lectures entitled "Introduction: Some Postulates and Definitions", "Spatial and Temporal Perspectives", and "The Sensible Present and the Remembered Past". It is hoped that these lectures, along with supplementary material, may soon be made available in book form.

To succeed the three members of the Carus Lecture Committee whose term of office expired in 1939, the following persons were elected to serve for a three-year period: C. J. Ducasse, Irwin Edman, and Arthur E. Murphy. Arrangements for the next series of lectures are under way and

some detailed announcement with respect to them should be forthcoming shortly.

For the Committee,  
Edward L. Schaub, *Chairman*

*Publication*

Professor Gregory D. Walcott, General Editor of the *Source Books in the History of the Sciences*, reports as follows:

"In June 1939, the fourth volume in this series, a *Source Book in Geology*, came from the press. Work upon the *Source Book in Chemistry* is definitely under way and about half or two-thirds of the manuscript for the *Source Book in Botany* has been completed. Professor Charles A. Kofoed of the University of California has agreed to undertake to prepare the manuscript of the *Source Book in Zoology*, beginning late in the fall of 1939. The manuscript for the *Source Book in Ancient Science* is nearly ready for the press. Only two other volumes have been considered to complete the series, one a *Source Book in Medieval Science*, which Professor Morris R. Cohen will have charge of, and a *Source Book in Physiology*. Whether this last one will be attempted or not will depend upon the best judgment obtainable when the volumes on botany and zoology are finished. This bare statement of the status of the series would seem to be all that is called for at this time."

The Committee has received two additional applications for grants in aid of publication offered by the American Council of Learned Societies. Three manuscripts are at present under consideration, but as yet the Committee is not prepared to make recommendations or reports upon them.

For the Committee,  
John Herman Randall, Jr., *Chairman*

*The American Documentation Institute*

The American Documentation Institute obtains for research workers, at cost, copies of unpublished manuscripts, rare books, old newspapers, foreign periodicals, bibliographies, tables, graphs, charts, maps, pictures (colored or uncolored), and X-ray plates. Microfilm copies cost one cent a page; photoprints, ten cents a page or approximately one-third as much as the commonly used photostat; microcolorfilm, five cents a picture. For every order there is a general service charge of twenty cents.

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A.D.I.'s latest venture is the making of bibliofilm sets of Journals, at the rate of one-half cent a page for ten or more consecutive volumes and one cent a page for odd volumes.

The sphere of A.D.I.'s activities is fast becoming worldwide, and already extends to leading cultural centers in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. For further information address 2101 Constitution Ave., Washington, D.C.

RAYMOND P. HAWES, *Delegate of the American Philosophical Association*

## FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Year Ended December 31, 1939

*Cornelius Krusé, Treasurer*  
*The American Philosophical Association*  
*Middletown, Connecticut*

Gentlemen:

We have examined the accounts and records of Cornelius Krusé, Secretary-Treasurer, for the year ended December 31, 1939.

All recorded receipts were found to have been deposited and all expenditures were evidenced by cancelled checks and supporting vouchers.

Cash balances at the end of the period were verified by inspection of bank statements as to checking accounts and the pass book of The Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company as to the savings account.

Based upon the foregoing, we hereby certify that the attached statement of receipts and disbursements reflects the results of the financial operations for the year ended December 31, 1939.

Respectfully submitted,

KNUST, EVERETT, AND CAMBRIA  
*Certified Public Accountants*

Middletown, Connecticut  
 January 8, 1940.

	<i>General Treasury</i>	<i>Revolving Fund for Publication</i>	<i>Montague- Adams Fund</i>
<i>Cash Balance—December 31, 1938</i> . . . . .	\$ 775.47	\$ 9,972.59	\$331.50
<i>Cash Receipts:</i>			
Eastern Division . . . . .	288.74		
Western Division . . . . .	134.44		
Pacific Division . . . . .	62.46		
Sale of Proceedings . . . . .	6.74		
Royalties (McGraw-Hill Book Co.) . . . . .		190.70	
Interest on Bank Deposits . . . . .		147.50	
<i>Total</i> . . . . .	<u>\$1,267.85</u>	<u>\$10,310.79</u>	<u>\$331.50</u>

*Cash Disbursements:*

Audit 1938 . . . . .	10.00
American Council of Learned Societies—Dues . . . . .	25.00
Printing Proceedings, 1938 . . . . .	204.44
Printing and binding of Volume XII <i>Philosophical Review</i> . . . . .	102.45
Postage . . . . .	36.06
Stenographic Aid . . . . .	15.31
Printing Announcement of Carus Lectures . . . . .	13.75

Reproducing <i>Source Book in Astronomy</i> , McGraw-Hill Book Company	230.00		
Translation: Elso Averill .....	35.19		
Translation <i>Source Book in Botany</i> , Charles C. Mish .....	103.45		
Subsidy to Maurice Mandelbaum ...			96.07
<i>Total</i> .....	\$ 407.01	\$ 368.64	\$ 96.07
Balances, December 31, 1939 .....	\$ 860.84	\$ 9,942.15	\$ 235.43

*Recapitulation of Funds*

General Treasury (Hartford-Connecticut Trust Company, Checking Account) .....	\$ 860.84
Revolving Fund for Publication (Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, Savings Account \$70787) .....	9,942.15
Montague Adams Fund (Central National Bank, Middletown Connecticut, Checking Account) .....	235.43
<i>Total—All Funds</i> .....	<u>\$11,038.42</u>

*Actions of the Board of Officers*

Voted that each Division receive its *pro rata* share of the 200 copies of the revised bibliography of John Dewey's writings, and that each Division be empowered to dispose of these copies as it sees fit.

The Board of Officers, in accordance with the new provision of the amended constitution, elected Cornelius Krusé secretary-treasurer of the Board for a three-year term.

The Board elected C. J. Ducasse, Arthur E. Murphy, and Irwin Edman, to the Carus Lecture Committee for a four-year term.

The Chairman of the Board of Officers, J. W. Hudson, appointed R. W. Sellars and F. C. S. Northrop to the Publication Committee for a four-year term. Maurice Mandelbaum was appointed to the Standing Committee on Bibliography. F. C. S. Northrop was also appointed delegate to the Council of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. R. P. Hawes was reappointed delegate to the American Documentation Institute.

For the Board of Officers,  
Cornelius Krusé, *Secretary*

## WESTERN DIVISION

*President:* Jay William Hudson

*Vice-President:* E. Jordan

*Secretary-Treasurer:* Charner Perry

*Executive Committee:* The foregoing officers and H. O. Eaton and D. W. Gotshalk

The fortieth annual meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association was held at the University of Missouri, at Columbia, Missouri, on April 20, 21 and 22, 1939.

The following program was presented:

Instrumentalism and Religion .....	C. E. Cory
Faith and Reason .....	Karl Schmidt
Recent Alignments in Philosophy of Religion.....	Irl G. Whitchurch
The Religion of the Philosopher .....	J. A. McWilliams
Meaning and the Transposability of Value .....	Ray Lepley
Does Freedom Imply Chance? .....	S. S. Brown
The Logic of Means and Ends .....	O. Martin
The Promise of American Politics (public lecture) .....	T. V. Smith
Symposium: The Place of Philosophy in Higher Education	

Charles M. Perry, *Chairman*

Philosophy in the Changing Curriculum .....	Martin ten Hoor
Philosophy and the College Student .....	M. C. Otto
Philosophy and the Social Sciences .....	Carl E. Taensch
A Clarification of Critical Realism .....	R. W. Sellars
Are All Propositions about the Future either True or False? .....	

Charles Hartshorne

The Relevant and the Irrelevant .....	Bertram Morris
(The three preceding papers, which were printed but not read, were discussed by: H. Feigl, D. W. Gotshalk, Harry Ruja, David F. Swenson, W. H. Werkmeister, Warner A. Wick.)	

Is Democracy Natural? .....	Richard Hocking
An Ethical Objective Relativism .....	John Clark
Philosophy as Theory of Criticism .....	Alburey Castell

(The three preceding papers, which were printed but not read, were discussed by: W. R. Leys, Clifford Osborne, Glenn R. Negley, Philip D. Rice, H. D. Roelofs.)

Recent Shifts in Ethical Theory and Practice (presidential address) ....	
.....	Jay William Hudson

An Analysis of the Idealistic Approach .....	J. A. Lynch
Husserl's Place in German Philosophy .....	Fritz Kaufmann
Plato's Philosopher King and American Democracy .....	L. P. Chambers
Confirmation and Disconfirmation of Empirical Hypotheses...K. Hempel	
On the Existence of an External World.....	William Barrett
Two Hundred Years after Hume's <i>Treatise</i> .....	Virgil Aldrich

The annual smoker was held on the evening of the twentieth; and on the afternoon of the twenty-first the Division was entertained at tea at the home of the President of the University of Missouri.

The annual business meeting was held on the morning of the twenty-second and the following business transacted. The minutes of the previous meeting were approved as mimeographed. The report of the treasurer as appended hereto was approved. Professor Glenn R. Morrow reported on the work of the Committee on Unemployment. It was the sense of the meeting that this work should continue.

The following motions recommended by the executive committee were seconded and passed:

That the Division express its sense of loss at the death of two of its members, Professor M. A. Caldwell and Dean Virgil Michel, and that the secretary be instructed to record this resolution in the Minutes.

That the study of the rôle of philosophy in universities be continued during the coming year and that the President be instructed to appoint a committee further to consider this problem.

That the President be instructed to appoint a committee to coöperate with the similar committee of the Eastern Division in aiding exiled scholars.

That the Division join with the Eastern Division in the following resolution: "To John Dewey on the approach of his eightieth birthday we tender hearty congratulations, and as a token of our admiration and affection we ask him to accept and to retain for the duration of his life the title of Honorary President of the American Philosophical Association."

That a special committee be appointed to canvass the members for voluntary subscriptions to pay an appropriate part of the subsidy required for the Dewey bibliography.

That the following new members be elected: Francis Knight Ballaine, William C. Barrett, Kenneth Archibald Brown, John J. Bushnell, Harold Buschman, Ralph W. Erickson, Marjorie Grene, Walker H. Hill, Fritz Kaufmann, William S. Minor, Sverre Norborg, Gerrit J. Schipper, Harry G. Schrickel, Wilfrid Stalker Sellars.

That the forty-first annual meeting be held at Ohio State University, at Columbus, Ohio.

That the Division express its gratitude to the University of Missouri for its hospitality.

The nominating committee proposed the following officers, and by unanimous vote the secretary was instructed to cast one ballot for them: President, Glenn R. Morrow; Vice-President, R. A. Tsanoff; Secretary-Treasurer, Charner Perry; Executive Committee (in addition to above *ex officio* members), Frank W. Dickinson and W. S. Gamertsfelder.

The meeting was adjourned.

### *Report of the Treasurer*

#### *Receipts*

Balance on hand April 16, 1938 .....	\$290.87
Dues collected .....	374.00
	<u>\$664.87</u>

#### *Disbursements*

Expenses of 1938 smoker .....	\$ 8.75
Telegram containing resolution .....	10.20
Dues and proceedings, Amer. Phil. Ass'n, 1938 .....	119.89
Printing stationery and due cards .....	18.95
Mimeographing and mailing minutes of 1938 meeting and notice of 1939 meeting .....	20.85
Annual pamphlet, 1939 .....	120.24
Bank charges on out-of-town checks .....	44.80
Stenographic services, stamps and miscellaneous supplies .....	25.82
	<u>\$329.50</u>
Cash on hand, April 20, 1939 .....	335.37
	<u>\$664.87</u>

Charner Perry, *Secretary-Treasurer*

## PACIFIC DIVISION

*President:* B. A. G. Fuller

*Vice-President:* Everett J. Nelson

*Secretary-Treasurer:* Paul Marhenke

*Executive Committee:* The foregoing officers and Edward O. Sisson *ex officio* for one year, F. R. Iredell (1940), E. W. Strong (1941), John A. Irving (1941).

The sixteenth annual meeting was held at the University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, on December 28, 29, 30, 1939. The following program was presented:

Random Notes on the History of Philosophical Organizations in the United States .....	H. G. Townsend
Why be Rational? .....	H. J. Phillips
The Philosophy of Essence and Christian Civilization .....	S. C. Tornay
The Significance, for Philosophy, of Education .....	E. A. Robinson
Whitehead's Answer to Hume .....	J. W. Robson
F. H. Bradley: A 19th Century Positivist .....	W. T. Jones
William James: A Perspective Realist .....	William Savery
Semantic, Notes on Linguistic Influences in Philosophy .....	W. H. Long
Operationism, Construction, and Inference .....	C. E. Bures
Certainty—Logical and Psychological .....	H. L. Searles
Some Solved, Pseudo, and Unsolved Problems .....	Barnett Savery
Thought and its Objects .....	A. I. Melden
On Certainty and Truth .....	C. Sullivan
<i>The Presidential Address</i> —Human Nature and the Present Crisis .....	Edward O. Sisson
The Moral Judgment in Economics .....	E. E. Erickson
The Need and the Illusion of Absolutes .....	R. T. Flewelling

The annual business meeting was held on December 30 at 9:30 A.M. The minutes of the 1938 meeting were approved as printed.

The treasurer's report was read and approved:

*Receipts*

Balance on hand December 27, 1938 .....	\$447.70
Membership dues .....	158.00
Fund to aid Jewish emigration from Germany .....	126.00
Interest .....	3.01
Total .....	<u>\$734.71</u>

*Expenditures*

A.P.A. Treasury .....	\$ 62.46
Annual Meeting (1938) .....	9.75
Postage .....	11.93
Mimeographing and Printing .....	18.75
American Friends Service Committee .....	226.00
American Trust Company .....	27
Total .....	<u>\$329.16</u>

*Balance on hand, December 6, 1939* ..... \$405.55

Audited by H. G. Townsend

By a rising vote the Division instructed the Secretary to include the following memorial in the minutes published in the annual *Proceedings*:

Seldom has the death of a man left so large a gap in our ranks as that made by the passing of Hartley Burr Alexander on July 27, 1939. The list of his interests and achievements is an impressive record of his breadth of culture and his sympathetic concern with the problems of his fellow-men. Few technical philosophers have enjoyed as wide a reputation and influence outside their special field as did he.

Hartley Burr Alexander was born at Lincoln, Nebraska, April 9, 1873. Leaving school at the age of 13, he worked for a while on a newspaper and then went on to the University of Nebraska where he received his A.B. in 1897. He went next, as a Fellow, to the University of Pennsylvania, and then, as a Fellow, to Columbia University from which latter institution he received the Ph.D. degree in 1901. For a number of years thereafter he was engaged in editorial work, first as an office editor and contributor to the *New International Encyclopaedia* and then as an editor and contributor to *Webster's Dictionaries*. In 1908 he was called to the department of philosophy at the University of Nebraska where he remained until he went to help in the organization of Scripps College in 1927. Professor Alexander's broad cultural interests and wealth of historical knowledge led to his being widely sought after by other institutions. He was special lecturer at the Sorbonne in 1925 and a recipient of the coveted decoration, *Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur*. He served with the School for Social Research in Chicago, was the Cooke-Daniels lecturer at the Denver Art Museum in 1927, a visiting professor at the University of Wisconsin, and a lecturer in the School of Philosophy, University of Southern California.

Professor Alexander's large conception of the nature of philosophy and its place in life brought him wide recognition outside philosophic circles. The knowledge gained through his early contact with the Indian Culture of his native state made him a welcomed collaborator in the field of American anthropology. He served both as President of the South Western Archaeological Federation, and as a member of the board of directors and lecturer of the School of American Research. In the field of letters he published odes, lyrics, and pageants, while in the field of architecture he won marked distinction. He was the author of inscriptions and program of art symbolism for the Nebraska State Capitol; the Los Angeles Public Library; the Fidelity Mutual Life Building at Philadelphia; the Science and Electricity Buildings of the Century of Progress, Chicago; the Oregon State Capitol, and others. This work brought him honorary membership in the American Institute of Architects. One of his latest interests was the work of the Department of Agriculture which he served as lecturer in the Great Plains Conference.

In the field of education Professor Alexander was not only a forceful and dynamic personality who won the respect and confidence of his students, but also a wise administrator. Scripps and Claremont Colleges owe much of their educational development to his wise counselling. His chief aim was to develop in students a broad understanding of human culture. While he was a stimulating lecturer, he delighted most in the skilful use of the Socratic method. His published works are too numerous to mention. Among the latest are *Truth and Faith*, 1929, and *God and Man's Destiny*, 1936. The respect in which his professional colleagues held him is evidenced by his election to the presidency of the American Philosophical Association in 1919, and of the Pacific Division in 1929. As a fitting climax to his life's work he received from his own Alma Mater, the University of Nebraska, at the 1939 Commencement, the degree of Litt.D. (F. Raymond Iredell)

The Secretary reported that contributions to the fund to aid Jewish emigration from Germany had amounted to \$126.00 and that this sum together with the \$100.00 appropriated by the Division at its 1938 meeting had been sent to the American Friends Service Committee by vote of the Board of Officers.

On recommendation of the Executive Committee the Division voted to change the type of membership of H. G. Alexander and A. I. Melden from associate to active.

On recommendation of the Executive Committee the following were elected to active membership in the Division: Herbert J. Phillips, John W. Robinson, Holcombe M. Austin, James G. Brown, Harris D. Erickson, Jay C. Knode, Charles E. Bures, and Edwin L. Marvin.

On recommendation of the Executive Committee H. A. Shuder was elected to associate membership in the Division.

The Executive Committee nominated E. W. Strong and John A. Irving for two-year terms on the Executive Committee. They were unanimously elected.

The Executive Committee nominated B. A. G. Fuller and Everett J. Nelson for the offices of President and Vice-President respectively. They were unanimously elected.

The Executive Committee recommended and the Division voted to accept the invitation of Stanford University to hold the seventeenth annual meeting of the Division in Palo Alto.

By unanimous vote of the Division the Secretary was instructed to invite Bertrand Russell to become a member of the Division.

The Chairman instructed the Secretary to thank Miss Willimae Straight, manager of Austin Hall, and Professor Savery, in the name of the Division, for their gracious hospitality.

Paul Marhenke, *Secretary-Treasurer*

### EASTERN DIVISION

*President:* Charles W. Hendel, Jr.

*Vice-President:* Raphael Demos

*Secretary-Treasurer:* Maurice Mandelbaum

*Executive Committee:* The foregoing officers and C. J. Ducasse *ex officio* for one year, Paul Weiss (1940), Charles A. Baylis (1940), Theodore M. Greene (1941), Otis H. Lee (1941), Edna A. Shearer (1942), Ernest Nagel (1942).

The thirty-ninth meeting of the Eastern Division was held in conjunction with the Western Division and at the time of the general reception of the Fifth Series of the Paul Carus Lectures at Columbia University, New York, N.Y., on December 27, 28, and 29, 1939.

The Fifth Series of the Carus Lectures was delivered by Professor Evander Bradley McGilvary of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, under the general title, "Toward a Perspective Realism." The three lectures given were entitled, "Introduction: Some Postulates and Distinctions", "Spatial and Temporal Perspectives", and "The Sensible Present and The Remembered Past".

The following program was presented:

Concurrent Sessions:

Two Meanings of Liberty .....	Philip Blair Rice
Law and Norm in Ethics .....	Roger Hazelton
Responsibility, Freedom, and Causality .....	Douglas Clyde Macintosh
Unified Science and Physicalistic Reductionism.....	W. K. Werkmeister

How to Make Our Ideas Clearer ..... Charles A. Baylis  
 Inquiry and Discourse ..... A. P. Ushenko

Session in Honor of the Eightieth Birthday of John Dewey:

Symposium: 'Dewey's Concepts of Experience and of Nature' .....  
 ..... William Ernest Hocking, Morris Cohen, John Dewey

Concurrent Sessions:

Slavery in Plato's Thought ..... Gregory Vlastos  
 The Fundamental Opposition Between Plato and Aristotle ..... Erich Frank  
 Esthetic Form and Criteria in Dewey and Croce ..... John M. Warbeke  
 How Hidden is the Metaphysics of Logical Positivism? ..... Paul A. Schilpp  
 Objects Perceived and Objects Known ..... A. G. Ramsperger  
 What is Empirical? ..... J. Loewenberg

Session Commemorative of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914):

Influence of Peirce on Dewey's Logic ..... James K. Feibleman  
 Peirce and Pragmatism ..... Walter H. Hill  
 The Essence of Peirce's System ..... Paul Weiss  
 A Critique of Peirce's Idea of God ..... Charles Hartshorne

The Business Meeting was held on Friday, December 29, at 12 N., President Ducasse presiding. The minutes of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting were approved as printed.

The following Treasurer's report was read and approved:

*Receipts*

Balance brought forward .....	\$3,271.74	
Sale of Abstracts .....	5.50	
Membership dues .....	824.45	
Interest .....	42.46	
<i>Total</i> .....		<u>\$4,144.15</u>

*Expenditures*

Dues to National Association .....	\$ 106.25
Printing and mailing of Annual Proceedings .....	182.49
Expenses of Annual Meeting .....	122.50
Secretarial assistance for Secretary .....	108.92
Secretarial assistance and postage for Committee on Opportunities for Employment .....	6.75
Multigraphing and sending of circulars for Committee on Exiled Scholars .....	14.77
Postage .....	85.02
Printing, dues cards, announcements, etc. ....	67.50
Expenses of Program Committee .....	73.64
<i>Journal of Philosophy</i> Abstracts (Columbia Meeting) ..	29.90
Miscellany .....	3.70
<i>Total</i> .....	<u>\$ 801.44</u>

<i>Balance on Hand</i> .....	<u>\$3,342.71</u>
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Audited by Paul Weiss and John M. Warbeke

The Auditing Committee reported that the Treasurer's report was examined and found correct.

The Nominating Committee (Harold A. Larrabee, Chairman, C. I. Lewis, and A. E. Murphy) presented the following nominees: for President, Charles W. Hendel, Jr.; for Vice-President, Raphael Demos; for Secretary-Treasurer for a term of three years, Maurice Mandelbaum; for member of the Executive Committee for a term of one year (to serve on the Program Committee for 1940), Charles A. Baylis; for members of the Executive Committee for terms of three years, Edna A. Shearer, Ernest Nagel. All were unanimously elected.

George H. Sabine was appointed by President Ducasse as a member of the Nominating Committee to serve for three years. Following the resignation of A. E. Murphy from the Nominating Committee, Cornelius Krusé was appointed to serve out his unexpired term of two years.

Albert G. A. Balz, Chairman of the Committee on Opportunities for Employment, gave the following report of the work of this Committee:

Your representative regrets his inability to report accomplishment during the past twelve months. In lieu of a report of activity, I would like to submit a statement by way of supplement to that laid before this body in 1938 and printed as a part of its proceedings. The year that has passed does not prompt me to offer serious qualifications of the findings expressed in the earlier report. The present statement is an expression of opinions and convictions rather than a record of questionnaire results. It reflects, indeed, such results, and to some extent the experience of being your committee representative. In so far as the statement is one of opinion and conjecture rather than factual record, I offer it with some hesitancy and embarrassment. Please be assured that I recognize the danger of its generalized character. Granted that the statement possesses a real measure of truth, it must be acknowledged that modifications may be necessary in view of varying conditions. What may be the case with respect to state-supported institutions, for example, may not obtain with respect to endowed institutions, or may obtain only in an indirect and special sense. Similarly, regional and other differences may require qualification of the general statement. I trust that what follows will be construed with recognition of these admissions.

In the following statement the word 'Education' is employed in a roughly limited sense. It indicates, first of all, a subject-matter. Without attempting definition, it is sufficient to state that the subject-matter called 'Education' is that with which departments of Education, and colleges and other institutions devoted to training for the profession of teaching and for administration of schools, are peculiarly concerned. The subject-matter called 'Education' includes theories concerning the nature, methods, and objectives of teaching processes, together with the general point of view and spirit that are associated with 'Education' as matter of inquiry and instruction in higher institutions.

Opportunities for employment in philosophy teaching, I suggest, are directly conditioned by 'Education' (in the sense just indicated). 'Education' may well be the most important factor determining the extent of such opportunities. Philosophy teaching, in a significant measure, will flourish or will decline, according to the place assigned to Philosophy in and through 'Education'. This will be true in a number of ways. 'Education' as a subject-matter includes in a critical sense conclusions concerning the relative importance, for those who teach and for those who are taught, of the various arts, disciplines, sciences, and materials forming the content that is to be communicated by teacher to pupil. 'Education' assuredly considers what is the proper curricular content of popular instruction, and

what is essential or inessential in training for the profession of teacher. Moreover, 'Education' treats of the significance of teaching and school system for the individual and for society. In still other senses, 'Education' affects employment in Philosophy. As a division of academic organization, points of view—I am tempted to say 'philosophies'—reigning in 'Education' departments and teachers' colleges affect the function and organizational welfare of departments of Philosophy. Finally, those who have been trained by the specialists in 'Education' carry into their teaching and administrative work the theories and conclusions of that subject-matter. Teaching in the public-school systems is largely accomplished by those who have been students of 'Education'. With respect to administration, the same is true. In consequence, the influence of 'Education' is formative far beyond higher institutions. It powerfully determines the mind and scholastic aims of the student entering college or university. Public opinion concerning the purposes of schooling, the importance of studying this or that subject-matter, and the relation of subject-matters to life and society, is largely guided by movements within 'Education'. Even institutions outside the public-school system are not unaffected. Obviously, it would require prolonged analysis to trace in detail the many ways in which 'Education' conditions the enterprise of Philosophy.

The point may be clarified by reference to the case of Psychology. It would be generally admitted, I believe, that 'Education' in the past four decades has profoundly affected the status of Psychology. The establishment of departments of Education had the effect of leading to the establishment of departments of Psychology where they did not previously exist, or to the acceleration of the development of existing departments. Courses in general, child, and educational psychology were found to be indispensable for 'Education'. To establish an academic division for the latter entailed giving new institutional strength to Psychology. Enlarged staff, increased equipment and resources, and higher prestige naturally followed. Moreover, popular and student interest in Psychology was stimulated.

In a fashion not dissimilar, the status of Philosophy has been and will be importantly conditioned by 'Education'. Whether the influence of 'Education' upon the status of Philosophy has been adverse or beneficial I am not now attempting to estimate. Nor do I attempt to evaluate the current situation. I am concerned only with the point that the theory and practice of 'Education' have an intensely practical bearing upon opportunities for teaching philosophy. Were 'Education', in the next decade let us say, to give a distinctly more important place to Philosophy than the place it now has, whatever this may be, Philosophy would profit somewhat as Psychology has profited.

If there be a measure of truth in the foregoing, it is barely possible that something may be done to alleviate unemployment in philosophy. I venture to indicate possible activities. An accurate estimate of conditions now prevailing with respect to 'Education' in relation to Philosophy might prepare the way for more practical steps. Conferences and exchange of ideas between philosophers and leaders in 'Education' might well be fruitful in consequences of importance with respect to employment. A cordial and coöperative relation seems to have been established between academic organizations for the pursuit of Psychology and those for the pursuit of 'Education'. It is quite doubtful whether this has been achieved with respect to Philosophy and 'Education'. Improvement at this point will assuredly contribute to employment for those whose equipment is primarily for the teaching of philosophy.

Respectfully submitted,  
ALBERT G. A. BALZ

This report was adopted and ordered filed.

Edgar S. Brightman, Chairman of the Committee on Aid to Exiled Scholars, expressed the appreciation of the Committee for the devoted work

of its secretary, Horace L. Friess. The following report of the Committee, given by the Secretary, was unanimously adopted:

The Committee was appointed by President Ducasse, in accordance with the vote of the Division at its business meeting on December 30, 1939, and has consisted of Edgar S. Brightman, Chairman; Edna Aston Shearer; Paul Weiss; and Horace L. Friess, Secretary. In the course of the year the Committee has received information either directly or indirectly about fifty-six exiled scholars in philosophy, as well as on seven who were in bordering fields of study, chiefly classics and education. Of the total number, twenty-three, as far as the Committee is informed, are still in various foreign countries, the rest in the United States of America.

The Committee is not aware that any of these scholars in the U.S.A. have received *permanent* appointments, and this fact must be kept in mind in rightly interpreting the following classifications. All are still candidates for positions.

In defining the group which it is designed to aid, the Committee has held that refugee students, who take their advanced degrees in philosophy in this country, should not be classified as exiled scholars.

The amount contributed to the emergency fund of the Committee by members of the Association totalled \$1,274.91, of which \$795 have been spent and \$200 loaned.

Besides meeting a limited number of acute needs, the substantial evidence of interest expressed by this fund unquestionably lends weight to the Committee's requests and strengthens its activities very appreciably. We recommend, therefore, that any plan which the Association may adopt for a continuation of the work of the Committee should include authorizing a second appeal for contributions. Such action, moreover, seems in accord with the original resolution of the Association in establishing the Committee.

The achievement of a fuller measure of success, however, lies in important respects beyond the power of the Committee. That is to say, it depends ultimately on the working out of ideas and policies by many institutions whereby a feasible and sound supplementing of our own teaching and scholarship by that of the exiled scholars can be effected. Some discussion of different proposals and of the issues involved would be timely.

Traveling lectureships, of which our Committee has sponsored three (in the cases of Drs. Kroner, Löwith, and Strauss), are recognized to have a very useful function in introducing already mature and experienced scholars to American colleagues and schools. The institutions coöperating in such a plan, however, should jointly provide for the lecturer's budget, since grants from the larger Foundations are by rule reserved for longer time appointments.

Our Committee corresponds with that of the Western Division (A. P. Brogan, Univ. of Texas, Chairman), with that of the American Theological Society (H. P. VanDusen, Union Theological Seminary, New York City, Secretary), with that of the American Psychological Association (B. S. Burks, Carnegie Institute of Washington, Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island, N.Y., Chairman), and with the British Council for Assisting Refugee Philosophers (Hon. C. A. Mace, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1, Secretary). Correspondence with the British Council raises the question whether plans for coöperation with foreign groups can be made in any terms more general than those of individual cases.

The Auditing Committee, J. H. Randall, Jr., and Ernest Nagel, appointed to examine the financial statement of the Committee for Exiled Scholars, reported that the statement had been examined and found correct.

The following recommendations from the Executive Committee to the Division were adopted:

That the Committee on Opportunities for Employment be continued and

enlarged by appointment by the retiring President, and that its name be changed to: Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy. (Harold A. Larrabee was subsequently appointed an additional member of this Committee.)

That this Committee be authorized to draw upon the treasury a sum not to exceed two hundred dollars for its work for this year.

That the Division appropriate a sum not to exceed fifty dollars to the Committee on Bibliography for the purpose of gathering information necessary for the preparation of a register of members of the American Philosophical Association.

That the Committee on Exiled Scholars be continued, and that a second appeal be authorized.

That the Committee be enlarged and that the appointment of the additional member be made by the retiring President. (Ernest Nagel was subsequently appointed by President Ducasse as the additional member of this Committee.)

That the more liberal interpretation of the rules for membership as they relate to employment be continued for the present year.

That the following applicants be elected to regular membership: Eugene Taylor Adams, Ruth Nanda Anshen, David Baumgardt, Erwin Biser, Marguerite Block, Emerson Buchanan, Justus Buchler, Joseph Caden Burk, James Gordon Clapp, James K. Feibleman, Nels F. S. Ferré, Lewis S. Feuer, Elizabeth Flower, Erich Frank, José A. Fránquiz, John Goheen, Rubin Gotesky, Mason W. Gross, Carl G. Hempel, Thomas Greenshields Henderson, Maylon H. Hepp, Felix Kaufmann, Ben F. Kimpel, Julius Kraft, Paul Oskar Kristeller, Richard Kroner, Helmut Kuhn, Kenneth Perry Landon, Arthur Lapan, Marcus B. Mallett, Ernest Addison Moody, John L. Mothershead, Milton K. Munitz, H. Richard Niebuhr, Lincoln A. Reis, Kurt Riezler, David E. Roberts, Delton Lewis Scudder, Vladimir Simkovitch, Juan B. Soto, Charles L. Stevenson, F. Champion Ward, William Stone Weedon, Forrest Oran Wiggins, Edgar Zilsel.

That the following applicants be elected Associate members: Kenneth D. Benne, Russell V. DeLong, Robert Goldenson, S. Arthur Stowater, Albert Wohlstetter.

In addition to the adoption of the aforementioned recommendations by the Executive Committee, the Division voted that the Executive Committee be authorized to grant a sum not to exceed a thousand dollars to the Committee on Exiled Scholars for its work. Professor Hook suggested that the Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy investigate the possibility of making public any vacancies occurring in departments of philosophy in colleges or universities as advocated by the American Association for University Professors.

Professor Northrop, delegate of the Board of Officers to the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, held in Columbus, Ohio, presented the invitation of the Executive Committee of that body that the Association meet with it jointly at its next meeting to be held in Philadelphia. After considerable discussion, it was voted that the Executive Committee of this Division be empowered to determine the time and place and character of the next meeting, taking into account the discussion by members of the invitation from the American Association for the

Advancement of Science as transmitted by Professor Northrop.

A letter of thanks was read from John Dewey on the occasion of his being notified at the time of his eightieth birthday on October 20, that he accept and retain for the duration of his life the title of Honorary President of the Division.

The following telegram of felicitation to John Dewey was sent to the president of the division:

Be it resolved: that the American Association of University Professors at its annual meeting of 1939 extend its greetings to its first president, Professor John Dewey, on his eightieth birthday. His mature enlightenment has been an example not only to his fellow philosophers but also to his colleagues throughout the teaching profession.

A vote of thanks was extended to Columbia University and to its Department of Philosophy for the cordial hospitality and the excellent arrangements for the meeting.

The following memorial notices were read and ordered printed in the *Proceedings*:

In the death of Isaak Husik, March 22, 1939, American philosophy lost one of its most distinguished scholars. Born at Vascutinez, Russia, 1876, son of a learned talmudist, coming to American in 1888, following then linguistic and mathematical studies through American and foreign schools to the taking of his doctorate (University of Pennsylvania, 1903), Professor Husik had at an early age acquired that wide command of Aryan and Semitic tongues which he afterward extended to include any idiom in which he knew a valuable source to lie. His teaching career began at Gratz College 1898; his connection with the University of Pennsylvania in 1904; his professorship at that University in 1922. His offerings turned from the medieval to the classic period; and finally to jurisprudence, for which he had prepared himself by taking his LL.B. (University of Pennsylvania) in 1919. To the medieval period, his best known contributions are a *History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy*, and a five-volume edition with translation and notes of Albo's *Ikkarim*. In the classic period, his last study returned to the topic of his first, the categories of Aristotle. In jurisprudence, beside translations of works of von Ihering and Stammler, one finds numerous analytical articles contributed to the law-journals. For some time prior to his death, Professor Husik had been collecting materials for a history of jurisprudence. Not the least matter of regret to the scholarly world, after the untimely loss of a personally valued colleague, will be the loss of a prospective work to which those who best knew the quality of Professor Husik's study looked forward with most anticipation. (Edgar A. Singer)

The death of Hartley Burr Alexander at Claremont, California, on July 27, 1939, closed a long and distinguished career. Born at Lincoln, Nebraska, in 1873, Alexander received the A.B. degree from the University of his own state in 1897, and his doctorate from Columbia University in 1901. He was professor of philosophy at the University of Nebraska from 1908 to 1927, lecturing at the Sorbonne, in Paris, during 1925. From 1927 until his death he was professor of philosophy at Scripps College, where he took a leading part in the formulation of the educational policy and curriculum of the newly founded institution, putting into effect ideas in a field which had long been of primary concern to him. In 1919 he served as president of the Eastern Division, and in 1929 of the Pacific Division, of the American Philosophical Association.

The thought of Professor Alexander was characterized by an unusual breadth of interests, expressed in the title of the course he gave at Scripps

College, "The Life of the Mind". His chief philosophical writings suggest, although they do not adequately reflect, this breadth: *The Problem of Metaphysics*, 1902; *Poetry and the Individual*, 1906; *Liberty and Democracy*, 1918; *Nature and Human Nature*, 1923; *Truth and the Faith*, 1929; *God and Man's Destiny*, 1936. He was actively a student of such diverse fields as the history and philosophy of religion, the fine arts and literature, the culture of the ancient world, and the American scene. He studied and published extensively on various aspects of the life, art, and thought of the American Indians. His published writings include poetry and occasional pageants. He was an editor and contributor to the *New International Encyclopedia* and to Webster's *Dictionaries*, and contributed to other reference-works.

But although he wrote extensively, it is even more as a man that his loss will be felt in the Association. Professor Alexander was a primitive thinker, in the sense that his position on every question was based on long and repeated thinking of his own. He had great faith in the common man, and philosophy was to him a reflection on the broad aspects of human experience, and an attempt to bring them together. Consequently, he was a powerful teacher, whose students felt that their concerns were his also. His character was marked by deep conviction, sincerity, vigor, and humanity, qualities which, united with his broad, humanistic interests, made him a unique figure in American philosophy, and a true lover of wisdom. (Otis Lee)

In the death of Dr. Francis Burke Brandt, who died on board the S.S. *Queen Mary*, September 1, 1939, at the outbreak of the present war, the American Philosophical Association lost one of its oldest and most devoted members. He became a member of the Association at its third meeting held in Princeton in 1903. It was to the field of education that Dr. Brandt devoted himself wholeheartedly. He was for years Principal of the Philadelphia School of Pedagogy, which during the last war merged with the Philadelphia Normal School. Until his retirement some years ago Dr. Brandt also taught in the West Philadelphia High School. Dr. Brandt was well known in Philadelphia not only for his work in pedagogy, but also for his books on Philadelphia. Among them were *The Majestic Delaware; The Nation's Foremost Historic River; The Wissahickon Valley Within the City of Philadelphia*, and *Byways and Boulevards in and About Historic Philadelphia*, of which he was co-author.

A large number of men in administrative positions in the public schools of Philadelphia are former students of Dr. Brandt, and reflect in their work the broad conception of education that characterized all of Dr. Brandt's teaching; the fruits of his labor are manifold and enduring. (Cornelius Krusé)

CORNELIUS KRUSÉ, *Secretary-Treasurer*

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(Addresses are given in the list of members)

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C. J. Ducasse (1940), Glenn R. Morrow (1942).

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## Bibliography—

C. J. Ducasse, *Chairman*, W. P. Montague, D. W. Prall, D. S. Robinson, H. W. Schneider, Maurice Mandelbaum.

## Carus Lectures—

E. L. Schaub, *Chairman*, A. O. Lovejoy (1941), Glenn R. Morrow (1941), H. D. Roelofs (1941), C. J. Ducasse (1943), A. E. Murphy (1943), Irwin Edman (1943).

## Publication—

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